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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

GEOGRAPHIC DETERMINANTS OF
SECURITY POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

Thornton W. Wilt

December 1979

Thesis Advisor:


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GEOGRAPHIC DETERMINANTS OF
SECURITY POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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December 1979

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Middle Eastern security issues and problems which are rooted to geographical considerations or determinants. Geography as a security policy determinant is also examined on a national level in selected countries which are the primary regional actors: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria, and Iraq. A substantial portion of the work is naturally oriented toward the Arab-Israeli territorial disputes. It is not, however, restricted to that theme. Demographic and strategic communications problems, completely separate from the Arab-Israeli issues, are also explored.

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INTRODUCTION

Nobody needs to be told that the Middle East, because of its abundant petroleum reserves, is critically important to the economic well-being of the Western world. Consequently, the intraregional and national politics, which at first sight might seem insignificant in their international ramifications, often have profound global effects. But, by simply reading headlines, one could easily overlook the fundamental and underlying causes of the region's political dynamics.

Cardinal among the influences on the region's politics is geography. At every stage of the region's historical development, geographical determinants acted as evolutionary catalysts. Strategic waterways, ports, boundaries, and ethnic groups always were found at the base of Middle Eastern historical dynamics.

Thus, the thesis presented in this study is that nation-states or countries have security policy tenets which are dictated by geography. And, the study of strategic geographic features can contribute greatly to the understanding and prediction of these policies. Therefore, this work will analyze the relationships between geography and the national security policy of selected states in the Middle Eastern region.

I. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GEOGRAPHY AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TERM GEOGRAPHY

As used in this study, the term "Geography" is not limited to the original Greek "geographia" meaning to describe the earth's surface, but is expanded to include man and his interrelationships with his physical environment. Social, economic, and political systems and their dependence or adaption to their natural settings are all encompassed in this broader definition.² The usage here, however, will be more restrictive in that the term "man" will be interpreted to be mankind in regional groupings or nations. The interrelationships will be, likewise, restricted to deal only with those that concern the security of these national groupings and their institutions vis-a-vis external political focus.

A nation-state refers to a people who are linked by an ideal, be it religious, linguistic, economic, social custom, political, etc., who occupy a defined space on our political globe.³ These nations of the world are spatially delineated by geopolitical boundaries; boundaries which are internationally recognized defining the exact physical limits of each nation's sovereignty. The nations of the world (over 150 of them) signing the Charter of the United Nations are equal in their sovereignty. However, the equality ends at the U.N.⁴ The world's nations are decidedly different in territorial size, population, topography, climate, industrial base, and military capability. These characteristics are determinants of power and are the ingredients of policies pursued to ensure economic well-being, security and survival.⁵

Certain ideological, religious, economic or ethnic groups which do not represent any internationally recognized state (the Palestinians, Kurds, and others), sometimes referred to as nations, can generate and project power and must, therefore, be considered in security planning.

B. GEOGRAPHY AND SECURITY

In the pursuit of geo-security goals, it becomes expedient at times to look beyond the established legal boundary line. Natural boundaries such as mountains, rivers, water sheds, population groupings, and oceans often serve as the real dividers of nations. The legal boundary may and often does lie in the midst of the more tangible natural barrier, but does not provide the security of the natural buffer.

A problem, of course, arises where one nation seeking absolute security occupies or uses these natural barriers to the detriment of the security policy of another. To quote Henry Kissinger: "In a community of sovereign states, the quest for peace involves a paradox: The attempt to impose absolute justice by one side will be seen as absolute injustice by all others; the quest for total security for some turns into total insecurity for the remainder..."⁶ An ideal example of this security-insecurity paradox is the Israeli occupation of the Sinai. Control of this vast desert barrier represents something near absolute insecurity on the Israeli border to Egypt.⁷ Exploring the nature of such geographically related security policies will be the essence of this paper.

Generally speaking, one of the most important factors affecting a nation's security is the location of position of that nation.⁸ Every position on the politically divided globe is unique. This uniqueness

is a product of, among other things, the limited set of relationships possible with those political entities occupying other positions, especially those adjacent positions. These peculiar relationships and a similarly unique historical background couple to form an established order or a national identity. It is the normal tendency of such an order to defend or perpetuate itself, which in the case of a nation often translates into defending its position. And what is important to the security of this position or order is an assessment of external threat and the ability of that nation to defend itself against that threat. Integral to this threat-security assessment is an analysis of geographic features: Is it near a major trade or communications route? Does it have suitable harbors? What is the nature of its neighbors and their dividing frontiers? These and many other analytic factors of geography are determinants of security policy.⁹ e.g. Nearly every developed industrial nation of the world except the Soviet Union is situated favorably on major ocean trade routes.¹⁰ From a security point of view this is an unfortunate circumstance for Soviet Russia and, possible, an unfortunate circumstance for those occupying positions in Russia's path to the sea. These nations blocking Russia's access to warm water ports must, of course, be conscious of a need for defense or a security policy mindful of the strategic aims of the Soviet Union.

Physical characteristics are likewise critical aspects of geographic related national security. Each country, when planning its defense posture, must pragmatically ask themselves: From where will the enemy invade? How can the country's critical areas be protected? The location of mountains, navigable rivers, deserts, and other prominent geographic features probably holds the answers or, at the very least, a

fundamental part of the answers to these important defensive questions. Some areas are particularly vulnerable because they represent a soft invasion route. Others are likely targets because of their economic value. And yet other territory becomes susceptible to attack because its occupation would be a strategic asset to the aggressor. The source of many border disputes presently contested can be traced to attempts by the contenders to gain positional advantage.¹¹ Physical geography then could be a substantial tool in the hands of the security planner. However, the territory of some nations does not lend itself to defense. These countries, without national barriers or size enough to swallow enemy intrusions, could possibly create a system of buffers. The idea here is simple: Buffer areas are established between domestic land and the lands of those who might be enemies. The British were particularly adept at this practice at the height of their colonial empire. The Ottoman Empire, Persia, and Afghanistan were all supported by the British in order to protect her communication routes to India. The long lived British Raj in India was in part made possible by a carefully constructed system of buffers.¹²

A final global feature which must be evaluated to some extent in every nation's security planning is the world's oceans. They can act as defensive barriers as depended upon for centuries by the British Isles and the Japanese Empires, or they can serve as communication links upon which the world's great seapowers have projected their offensive might. Regardless of naval strength, however, the ocean bordering states have, in essence, a wet buffer which, depending upon their expertise and sophistication, provides a varying degree of security.¹³ There

have been several scholarly efforts addressed at determining underlying constants or trends in world foreign/security policy growing out of geographic position.

C. GEOPOLITICS

During the first half of this century the Englishman Halford Mackinder revolutionized the study of geography. He proffered a theory which basically stated that the inner Eurasian land mass was the pivot region of world politics. Mackinder went on to warn that world domination could result if one power were allowed to control the Eurasian heartland. Since he first propounded the theory in 1904, Mackinder updated it in 1919 to account for technological and population changes, but the idea was still the same. As stated by Mackinder: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the world."¹⁴

In 1943, he again updated his theory. He then presented a North Atlantic unit which was equal in importance to the Heartland. Monsoonal Asia and the South Atlantic Basin were also listed as significant areas for the future.¹⁵ An American geographer and foreign policy expert, Nicholas Spykman, in 1944 followed Mackinder's school in expounding the importance of geographical considerations in security policy. He stressed that the location of a given country relative to the equator, oceans, land masses, raw materials, and communication routes may well determine the potential enemies of that country. These locational considerations, warned Spykman, must be studied and evaluated in conjunction with the modifying effects of climate and topography. Security

problems can and should be viewed in geographic terms, concluded Spykman, thereby being of direct and immediate use to those who must formulate foreign policy. Peace or security inevitably involves the territorial relationships of states and each state must assess its geographic situation to determine the best security policies.¹⁶

Today, the Heartland theory has, again, been refined. Saul B. Cohen in Geography and Politics in a World Divided describes geostrategic regions. These regions are the trade-dependent Maritime World and the Eurasian Continental World. The theory does not hold that all political units comprising the regions have identical strategic or ideological beliefs. In the case of the Maritime World, however, it does hold that the economic well being of the region depends upon free trade. Thus, the strategic security planning of the trade dependent areas must focus upon communication routes. So, as much as Soviet Russia must strive to project her power to the oceans, those maritime nations must strive to ensure their own access to the seas and prohibit the Continental World from interdicting their lifeline.

The central point here is that the political division and boundaries of the earth are a dynamic sort of man-made phenomena and the nations of the world would appear to fall into membership of one of just a very few major economic or ideological groups. The Soviet Union is, today, the unofficial leader of the Continental World and the United States by virtue of economic and military strength is in the vanguard of the Maritime World. The interest of some nations are so divergent or backward that most theoreticians would not consider them a part of either major group. Others, due to technical innovations and/or ideological ferment, find it necessary or desirable to move from one group

to another. Thus, the regional groups are ever changing in membership and physical size as each vies for positional advantage over the other. Again, positional advantage represents security or insecurity depending upon the interests of the viewer. So, the concept of positional advantages would offer an explanation for the seemingly inordinant interest of the Soviet Union in small, developing countries such as Afghanistan or Yemen.

Today's national security planners might criticize the dated theories of Mackinder, Spykman, and even Cohen for being overtaken by technology. One might ask, with some merit, if modern aircraft and ships do not negate geographical obstacles. The answer is that, of course, scientific advances have reduced or eliminated what may have been an obstacle of geography in the past when Mackinder first proffered his theory. The nuclear submarine, for example, can today effectively operate worldwide for extended periods without the benefit of overseas bases. Technology has not, however, permitted aircraft and ships to be used worldwide without land based support. Without sea and air power it becomes extremely difficult or impossible to project, or have the capability to project, power on land in support of security goals.¹⁷ Modern technical knowledge has permitted the ultimate projection of force, thermonuclear destruction, without significant influence by geographical features. But the use of the so-called strategic weapons must be regarded as the failure to obtain security goals by more conventional means - means which remain profoundly affected by distance and ease of transport. Stated another way, geography is still a consideration in security planning. Although modern travel has reduced time over distance, the distance remains the same.

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So, accepting the previously stated ideals of Mackinder, et al as being viable today, we can fashion a model from these theories to facilitate viewing world security problems. Understanding the need of the "Trade-Dependent Maritime World" to have free access to their trade partners is a key to understanding why the strategic security planning of these countries must seek to protect trade/communication routes. Likewise, the Continental World, led by the Soviet Union, must in its quest for security seek at least the capability to deny the trade lifeline to the Maritime World. This basic confrontation of the Continental World led by the Soviets, and the Maritime World, dependent upon the open seas, centers in the Middle East. In this energy-hungry era when the United States, Western Europe and Japan, among others, are so dependent upon the petroleum from the Persian Gulf, the Soviet strategists have sought the power to deny, by force if necessary, that valuable commodity to the West and its allies. In oil, Soviet Russia found an even more compelling reason than their Czarist predecessors to expand their influence into the Middle East. As for the major powers in the Maritime World - e.g. the U.S., Western Europe and Japan - the Middle East is equally vital for their own survival, and they are likewise determined to perpetuate the interests which they have built up through the years.

D. THE MIDDLE EAST

"Middle East" in this paper refers to Egypt and those countries lying between the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Sea including Egypt (see map p. 15). The locational importance of this area cannot be overemphasized. It is a land bridge connecting three

continents and sitting astride some of the world's most important sea-lanes. Major world land and sea trade routes have crossed the region for millenia and have been the cause of nearly constant geopolitical maneuvers.¹⁹ Six seas and three gulfs project into this tricontinental area: the Caspian, Black, Aegean, Mediterranean, Red, and Arabian seas; and the Aden, Oman, and Persian gulfs. The importance of much of the land area is amplified because it connects these crucial waterways. The Suez isthmus is, of course, the most flamboyant example of this increased land value.²⁰

In the days before steam powered ships, the trip between Britain to India took five to eight months when taking the route around the African continent. The overland routes through the isthmus, which is the Middle East, proved invaluable. Then, in 1869, upon the completion of the Suez Canal, the region took on an increased vitality. The waterborne communication proceeded uninterrupted to the mercantile ports of India and beyond.²¹

As trade from the far flung British, Dutch, and French colonies poured through the canal and the overland trade routes, along with it came people, ideas and trappings of varied and exotic cultures. Southwest Asia, the Middle East, took on a new meaning as the world's crossroads. Today, roughly a century later, many of the caravan routes have been replaced by all weather highways and railroads. Oil pipelines and overhead air routes have also been added to the scene. Shipping is certainly no less important, although periodically interrupted by political conflict. As the world's crossroads, it seems a natural phenomenon that the Middle East has, since the cold war era of the 1950's,

emerged as a barrier between the Eurasian Continental World and the Maritime World. This fundamentally national struggle has sometimes been referred to imprecisely or simplistically as the free world versus the communist world.

This barrier is strategically significant to both if only because of position. The significance, however, has been multiplied many fold as the world, especially what we have labeled the Maritime Trade-Dependent World, becomes more and more dependent on the petroleum originating from the area.²² Soviet domination of this region could ruinously deprive the Trade-Dependent World of energy which would greatly alter the way of life known today. At the same time, such domination would grant to the navies of the continental powers free access to the high-seas threatening the very lifeline of the Maritime World.

The strategic barriers of natural boundaries of the Middle East are generally comprised of deserts surrounding the critical areas of Egypt in the Southwest and across the southeastern portion of the Arabian Peninsula. The high plateaus and mountains of the Northern Tier act as a divider between Arab and non-Arab populations of the area. On the eastern side of the region, Pakistan and India are naturally separated by the Thar or Indian Desert. The Northeast is crowned by the Pamir Mountain Knot and the Karakoram Range. The Black and Caspian Seas together with the high lands of the Northern Tier states provide a more or less natural border between Iran and Turkey and Soviet Russia. Except in the East and Northeast, the entire area is nearly surrounded by water. As mentioned, the Black and Caspian Seas occupy areas in the North. The Persian Gulf and Red Sea, of

course, flank the Arabian Peninsula. And finally, the North of Egypt and western boundary of the rest of the area is bound by the Mediterranean.²³

Among the more important of the critical areas are the population centers along the Nile in Egypt, the Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq, and the Persian Gulf coast of the Arabian Peninsula. The bulk of the region's population is found in the more hospitable climate of the Northern Tier. Because of the great oil industry, the entire Persian Gulf and surrounding land area could also be considered a critical area.²⁴ .

Throughout recorded history the area of the Middle East has witnessed the rise and fall of many great empires including Egypt, the Empire of Alexander, the Seleucid Kingdom, and the competing empires of the Persians and the Romans. Nearly the entire area was finally unified by the forces of Islam in the seventh century, and Islam has been the dominant religion of the region since.

The consistency to be noticed here from ancient history until nearly the present is that these various empires expanded along communications or trade routes. The valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates leading to the silk route to China and the spice routes of India were as important to the empires of ancient and medieval times as they were to the British in the last three centuries. The communication links formed to avoid geographic obstacles have been, for the large part, constant through centuries. The Nile Valley, the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, the Red and Black Seas, and the Persian Gulf are today, as they were centuries ago, of great strategic importance. They are routes which connect continents and oceans, and they provide access

to the critical areas of the Middle East. Thus, they provide a way to control the politics of the region. In short, the region was and is a fulcrum between cultures - a crossroads, if you will, of civilizations.²⁵

A review of the modern history of the Middle East may help in establishing background and continuity for the central theme. By the 18th century, France, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Czarist Russia, and Germany all had interests in the Middle East. France began its commercial and cultural ties in Syria and Lebanon as early as the Crusades and signed the first treaty of capitulation in 1535 with the Ottomans. The French gained Algeria as a colony in 1830 and established Tunisia and Morocco as protectorates in 1881 and 1904, respectively. After the first world war, she administered Syria and Lebanon through mandates which was only one result of the long standing economic and cultural ties. The pervasive influence of the French is very much in evidence in Syria and Lebanon today.²⁶

The British influence in the area became considerable after the defeat of the Napoleonic forces in Egypt at the hands of the English-backed Ottomans in 1799. From that time the British made inroads into the territory of the Ottomans and the more remote areas of the Arabian peninsula. The goal of the British Empire was to protect the communication routes to India, the Empire's most valued colony. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the canal quickly became one of the world's most important waterways, and the British would exert considerable influence to participate in its operations and profits. As a natural outgrowth of the purchase of shares in 1875 of the Canal

Company, the British came to be the protector of all Egypt. The policy goal of the British was not territorial acquisition, rather it was to insure the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a means of protecting their own trade routes to India and the East from the expanding Russians. The British influence was at its zenith just after World War I when she exercised mandate authority over Palestine and Iraq and remained protector of Egypt. Also, she assumed positions on the Persian Gulf and Arabian peninsula.²⁷

The involvement of Russia in Middle Eastern affairs has been long standing. The principal goal of the Czarist policy was the attainment and security of naval and commercial use of first the Black Sea and then the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean. Southern Russia began rapid economic development in about 1830. To sustain the growth and international trade activity of this area, the Moscow government had to insure, so-to-speak, a window to the world. As the port of Odessa grew with increased trade, security of the Straits became tantamount to the economic well-being of the country itself. By 1880, 50 percent of Russia's international export trade activity originated on the Black Sea and transitted the Straits. With this increased dependence on the narrow waterways, came increased vulnerability and the second of Russia's principal policy goals: The denial of the straits to the naval forces of nonriparian states. Great Britain, France and later Germany represented the gravest threats to Russia's well-being. In other words, these European countries possessed the necessary power to interrupt her access to the high seas.²⁸

World War I had a profound effect upon this power balance. Germany and its ally, Austria-Hungary, were defeated and essentially removed from the geopolitics in the Middle East. But, the area did not go wanting for power struggles. After the Ottoman Empire was dismembered, Arab, Kurdish, Turk, Armenian, and other nationalistic movements emerged. Also, new and disrupting to the region was Zionism, or the growth of the Jewish nation in Palestine. The Middle East began to take on the political borders we see today.

In 1927, Saudi Arabia established itself and immediately set up a symbiotic relationship with Great Britain. The British, being the dominant power in the region, recognized the Saudi state and in return was granted a privileged position in that country. In the same year, the British recognized the independence of Iraq and was allowed to have three air bases in the new country. By 1936, Egypt was relatively free of Britain's domination, although a military force was left behind to protect the canal zone.²⁹

Syria and Lebanon were, during the same period, moving out from under French control. Lebanon was declared a republic in 1926 while Syria waited until 1936 before a treaty was ratified which ended the French mandate. However, France permitted little sovereign activity in either country. It was not until after World War II that Syria and Lebanon achieved de facto independence.³⁰

World War II, in fact, nearly completed the delineation of political boundaries of the region. In 1946, Jordan became independent and was followed by smaller Persian Gulf states (Kuwait became independent in 1963).

World War II truly signalled the end of imperialistic domination in the Middle East. The death-throes of this domination was probably seen in 1956 as France and Britain tried unsuccessfully to impose their will in the Suez Canal area. Although Great Britain maintained military outposts in the Middle East, she in truth could ill-afford the expenditure required to control the politics of the Middle East. In view of the rising nationalism, especially among the Arabs, it is doubtful that even the superpowers could exert enough force to control the area.³¹

What we see today is the Middle East emerging with a new found economic wealth coupled with an old and powerful religious ideology. It is still the bridge between the Eurasian Continental World and the Trade Dependent Maritime World to be sure, but its own potential power gives it an identity separate from the two major geostrategic regions. So, what is being witnessed today, is the nations of the Middle East taking control of their own positions. They are refusing to act solely as a chess board for imperialists. The convenient positions which have made the Middle East a prized piece of real estate for centuries compounds their contemporary national security problems.³²

The year 1955 seems to be a good beginning point for massive Soviet involvement into Middle Eastern politics. In that year, amid cold war tensions, the Northern Tier countries of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and even Iraq chose to politically align themselves against the Russians ("Russians" is used here vice "Soviet" because the perceived threat seemed to be traditional Russian Territorial expansion rather than ideological communist expansion). This alignment was officially stated in the Baghdad Pact. Because Soviet policy seemed to be checked by the Pact, she developed a policy which bypassed the Northern Tier. The

Soviets sought to win the cooperation and friendliness of the Arab World. She extended economic aid and loans to Egypt, Syria and Yemen. Iraq also gained such favors in 1958 when her pro-Western government was removed by revolution. The huge arms deal with Egypt in 1955 was the most visible example of the Soviet strategy to win the Middle East. Every rift and ideological difference between the Arab and Western countries was inflamed or exploited by Soviet propaganda. Resentment traced to years under Western colonial domination only helped the Russian cause.³³

After the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Soviet Union intensified her efforts to gain influence among the Arab nations. She centered upon the nearly complete support of Israel by the United States in her propaganda campaign. Israel was presented as evidence of the still lingering imperialistic influence in the Middle East. Russia wanted the Arabs to believe that only she among the superpowers had their well-being in mind. This campaign certainly paid dividends, not so much because the Arabs believed in the good will of the Soviets, but because of the perceived evils of American supported Zionism/imperialism.³⁴

The long range Soviet objectives were to make the Arab Middle East economically, technologically, and militarily dependent. She built or aided in building, among other projects, the Aswan Dam and Helwan Steel Plant in Egypt and the Euphrates Dam in Syria. Also, she and her East European satellites aided in oil exploration, development and refining in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Additionally, these countries were equipped with Russian or communist bloc arms. The Soviet Union wanted, in summation, to make the power bases of the Arab regimes dependent upon

her own system. This marriage of economics, if you will, would insure a continued Soviet presence in the Middle East and be the means to the even more important goal of denying this most strategic area to the Western powers.³⁵

Thus, at every stage of the operation of historical forces in the Middle East geography lay at the base. Strategic waterways, ports, caravan routes, demography and strategic positioning have all been at the root of the region's politics and security considerations. And, as these factors impacted in history, so are they fundamental in contemporary events. The industrial world's great thirst for Middle Eastern oil has only served to amplify the significance of the above listed geographic factors. The research will now look at these geographic determinants of security policies in three groups of Middle Eastern states: (1) Saudi Arabia and Egypt, (2) Israel, and (3) Syria and Iraq.

II. SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT

A. SAUDI ARABIA

1. Historical and Geographical Setting

Saudi Arabia has become the leadoff nation in the study because of its great oil wealth and resulting political power. Additionally, occupying approximately 4/5 of the Arabian Peninsula, an area roughly equivalent to 1/3 of the United States, she is, in land area, the largest of the Arab states.³⁶

Compared to the so-called front-line Arab states (those adjacent to Israel), the Saudis have remained aloof of what they consider bothersome, petty politics. From their own point of view, they are, after all, a nation of the purist, most noble Arab tribesmen who must protect the faith. Socially medieval by Western standards, Saudi Arabia has, nevertheless, been politically very stable and a consistent friend of the United States. She has enjoyed a long standing, excellent working relationship with a group of American oil companies as a member of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). As defenders of Islam, they have always been very much anti-communist and unresponsive to communist propaganda or Russian intervention. The Saudis and Russia have consequently been without diplomatic recognition by one another for nearly forty years.³⁷

For the largest part of its existence, Saudi Arabia has had little reason to feel insecure. A look at the size and relief features of this harsh and uncompromising environment indicates how extremely difficult it would be to invade and control the country militarily

(see map p. 27). The Western or Red Sea coast has a 15 to 75 mile wide desolate plain. Springing out of the plain are mountains varying in height from 3 to 4 thousand feet in the north to 10 thousand feet on the Yemen border. The northern section of the mountains and plain is called the Hijaz where the holy cities of Mecca and Madinah are located. To the south is found Asir, the only area of the entire country to receive regular rainfall.³⁸

East of the mountains the terrain gently slopes to the Persian Gulf. The central desert area is called Majd which is the historical home of the ruling family and location of the capital, Riyadh.³⁹

A vast uninhabitable area known as the Rub'al Khālī (The Abode of Emptiness) bounds the south of Saudi Arabia. The entire area of approximately 830,000 square miles is home to only 5-7 million people.⁴⁰ So, until the extent of the petroleum reserves was realized there simply were no rewards to justify any sort of military conquest - hence a degree of security.

However, Saudi Arabia now has something worth protecting - approximately 25 percent of the world's exploitable oil reserves. The probability of being invaded still seems very slight. The economy, dependent almost solely on the oil industry, however, renders the kingdom vulnerable to disruption if not destruction. Oil accounts for over 95 percent of the country's exports by value. Moreover, royalties from the oil companies contribute in excess of 90 percent of the government income.⁴¹ Part of this oil export is transported through the Mediterranean port of Sidon via the TAPLINE passing through Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The great bulk of this precious commodity, however, is

moved by tanker from the terminal at Ras Tanura on the Persian Gulf. Herein is found the soft belly of the Saudi economic life and that of nearly the entire oil producing Middle East. Blockage of the Persian Gulf could cripple the oil industry of the area and the energy intensive economies of the Maritime World.⁴²

2. Geosecurity Issue Areas

As has been mentioned above, it would be irresponsible on the part of the Soviet Union, as the contender of the Maritime World economy, not to at least develop the capability to take advantage of this accident of geography - the capability to deny access to the Persian Gulf. And, it can easily be documented that the Soviet government is actively constructing a regional, military presence with that very interdictory muscle.

The Soviet Navy actually entered the Indian Ocean in 1968, and has gradually increased its strength to the present force of about 20 ships. This task force, however, was balanced by French, British, Australian, and U.S. naval presence.⁴³ But, oil has grown more important and the Russian influence more prevalent. In fact, the Russians seem intent on making the Horn of Africa their own armed camp. In March of 1978, there were 16,000 Cuban armed forces and 1000 Russian advisors in Ethiopia.⁴⁴ Also, there is reason to believe that the Soviets plan to build an air base at Massawa, Eritrea. This base, coupled with their airfield and base facilities at Aden in Southern Yemen, control the southern entrance to the Red Sea. It is the consensus of NATO analysts that by building such a presence, the Soviet Union can threaten the oil routes from the Persian Gulf as well as Saudi Arabia itself.⁴⁵ This conclusion is, in fact, the only logical one

which can be drawn. The only strategic importance of the Horn is geography. It controls the approaches to the Red Sea and thus, the Suez Canal. Therefore, the flow of raw materials to Western Europe and the Red Sea states could easily be interdicted. Also, it places Russian military forces within easy reach of the oil producing giants and the jugular of the Free World.⁴⁶

There is also evidence of Soviet influence, though not control, in Oman. This country, lying to the southeast of the Arabian Peninsula and controlling the Western approach to the Persian Gulf, has been beset by Marxist guerilla activity. The rebellious Dhofari tribesmen and the PFLO (The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman) have enjoyed the support and sanctuary of South Yemen, a Russian client.⁴⁷

Additionally, the Saudis have reason to be leery of their northern neighbor, Iraq. Although the threat from Iraq seems to have subsided considerably, she is known to be a political radical with extensive stockpiles of Soviet built weapons.⁴⁸ Another Soviet Union political and geographically strategic move which proved to be uncomfortably close to the Saudi's interests, was the imposition of Mohammad Taraki's communist regime in Afghanistan.⁴⁹

If we consider the Soviet influence in Libya and the Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean, it becomes easy to visualize communist Russia's strategy of encirclement to control the land bridge that is the Middle East. More importantly, a quest for military dominance capable of closing the Red Sea and Persian Gulf is obvious. Security to Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or any other potential external enemy can be simply stated as protection of the oil fields and freedom

of access to the high seas. The fact that Saudi Arabia has oil and requires unrestricted passage through strategic sealanes to market that oil and receive consumer goods is a factor of geography or a measurement of power. These factors are critical to the Saudi way of life and must be central in their national security policy considerations.

Obviously, a country possessing the monetary wealth of Saudi Arabia would not sit idle while they perceived the threats accounted above. The Saudis have taken actions to counter the Soviet expansion in the region which include: (1) Granting aid to Syria to help check radial Iraq. (2) Using money to persuade Yemen to stop supporting the Dhofar rebels in Oman. (3) Sold oil to Taiwan at reduced prices because of their strong anti-communist politics. (4) Backing secessionists in Eritrea as a direct counter to the Soviets establishing bases in that province. (5) Supplying money and arms to Somalia to aid in the fight against Soviet/Cuban backed Ethiopia.⁵⁰

At home, the Saudis have stepped up their own arms modernization program including the highly publicized F-15 purchase.⁵¹ Additionally, there was an unofficial, unspoken alliance among Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Gulf states and the United States. Where the freedom of the Gulf and oil transportation are concerned, the interests of these above listed states are parallel and they conveniently jell to balance the Soviet presence.⁵²

Unfortunately, not all American and Saudi Middle Eastern policies parallel so nicely. The United States, on one hand, is committed to the support of Israel, and the Saudis, on the other, consider Zionism one of the greatest threats to the stability of the region. This perceived threat of Zionism was seemingly repressed or ignored by the

Saudis while they concentrated on the then more dangerous hazard of Soviet expansion. However, two seemingly unrelated events - the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the fall of the Shah apparently caused a major shift in Saudi Arabian foreign policy and related security posture.

When Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, the rest of the Arab world, particularly the more radical front line states, felt that Egypt had bought their peace, at the insistence of the United States, with the land of the Palestinians (see p. 49). Most of the Arab nations were, therefore, lining up politically behind the Palestinians. The Saudis, whether it be because of religious or pan-Arabic feelings or a combination, have fallen in line with the other Arab states in protesting the peace treaty.⁵³

Across the Persian Gulf, in the closing months of 1978, the 37-year reign of the Shah of Iran was falling apart. It was not collapsing because of direct Soviet involvement or because the country was economically backward. Additionally, the Shah was, after all, a long time ally of the United States. One cause the Saudis saw in this political disintegration of Iran was American backed modernization at a too rapid pace. Furthermore, the Americans were unable to control events in the area to their own security advantage.⁵⁴

Two Saudi Arabian political spokesmen, Sheikh Abdul Rakman Al Ghadhi and Prince Saud, have broken from the American position that the Soviet Union is the major destabilizing force in the region. Now the official Saudi position is that Zionism is the worst threat to Middle East security. Additionally, there have been repeated hints

that Saudi Arabia will, after a break lasting some 40 years, resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (the Saudis at this time recognize no communist states).⁵⁵

The Russians do not appear altogether opposed to the idea of increased dialogue with the Saudis. After years of standard propaganda statements referring to the Saudis as "reactionary" and "feudal", the leading Middle East expert in the Soviet Union, Igor Belyaev, has recently stated that the Soviet's and Saudi's views of the needs and goals of the Arab peoples are congruent and constitute a sound basis for cooperation. Another example of a softening of attitudes between the two countries, is the fact that in April, 1979, the Soviet Union's nation airline has resumed flights into Sanaa, the capital of North Yemen. This resumption is significant because it had to be done with the Saudi's permission.⁵⁶

Trying to interpret these new Saudi policy moves is, of course, difficult. But it is evident that they feel that their staunch alignment with American policy is too costly. Standing too close to the United States would mean losing friends and leadership in the region. If the Iranian model has been read correctly, the security partnership with the Americans carries no guarantee of internal security. The Saudis have, obviously, decided to stand by their Arab and Muslim brothers. Egypt is, of course, left out of the fold but the Saudis must feel that they have taken the most stabilizing position. Further, they have not completely abandoned the American position. Many interests of the two countries are coincidental. Only in the Palestinian-Zionism question are they divergent. Closer association with the Soviet Union has already stopped much of the disturbing Soviet propaganda.

And there are indications that the Saudis may "play the China card" to check the bothersome Soviet-Cuban intervention in the region.⁵⁷

Russia also stands to win if diplomatic relations are established with Saudi Arabia. The Soviets have an Islamic population of about 45 million of which they are, in light of the recent revolution in Iran, somewhat afraid. It would be a legitimatizing factor for the Soviets in the eyes of their own Muslims to have the recognition of Saudi Arabia.⁵⁸

Behind these policy considerations, lay the determining factors of geography. And the trade lines through the Persian Gulf and Red Sea are the basic determinants in the diplomacy not only of the Saudis but everyone of the external powers who depend upon Saudi oil. Saudi Arabia's security policy is consequently oriented toward the protection of these areas.

If relations between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia are warming somewhat, even to the point of diplomatic recognition, it should not be interpreted as a great strategic victory of geopolitics for the Soviets. They will not have increased their ability to project power in the area nor will the Free World's ability have been diminished. To the Saudis, the communist government of Russia remains "godless" and fundamentally opposed to the principles of Islam. The Soviets, after all, have opposed Arab League member, Somalia, in its armed conflict with Ethiopia and it forced the communist regime of Nur Mohammad Taraki on the unwilling Muslims of Afghanistan. The Saudis may make accommodations with Russia, China, the United States or others if it is in their national interest to do so. However, a close alliance with the Soviets is not in their interest and will not be in the foreseeable future.⁵⁹

B. EGYPT

1. Historical and Geographical Setting

Egypt has been linked in the research with Saudi Arabia because of similar power in world politics. Egypt's influence, however, was and is not a result of mineral wealth but primarily of strategic positioning, strategic waterways and demography.

Located on the northeastern tip of the African continent, Egypt was described in the fifth century B.C. as "the gift of the Nile."⁶⁰ The river, in fact, gave rise to agriculture as early as 5100 B.C. (this was some 2000 years before such deliberate use of crops and livestock appeared anywhere else in the world). The Egyptian Nile Valley was politically unified about 3100 B.C. and, unlike other early civilizations which sprang up and died out throughout the course of history, the community along the Nile has continued uninterrupted. It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of the life-giving Nile. Without this geographical accident, Egypt could not exist. The country is desert wasteland which is divided by the oasis-like river valley.⁶¹ The virtually rainless, uninhabitable desert comprises nearly 96 percent of Egypt's 386,000 square mile area (the area is roughly equivalent to one-half again the size of Texas). After subtracting the land area covered by urban development and inland water, there is left only about 3.5 percent of the total area to support a population of over 40 million people.⁶² This entire population, save about 4 percent, is found in the narrow Nile Valley and protruding delta (nearly two-thirds of the people are located in the delta).⁶³

Egypt enjoys, compared to her Middle Eastern neighbors, a very homogenous population. Over 90 percent are of Eastern Hamite stock with minorities composed principally of Greeks, Italians, and Syro-Lebanese.⁶⁴ The significance of these seemingly endless statistics about the rivers, land, and population is that they point out the nearly absolute dependence of the country upon the Nile. The entire valley running south to north through the length of the country is the essence of what the geographers term, a critical area.

The Nile and its associated agriculture and communications network permitted or caused the homogeneity of the population and the early development of the entire valley as a single, political unit as opposed, for instance, to the city states of Mesopotamia. Additionally, the surrounding terrain would support or hide secessionist activity. Therefore, once central authority was established, its continuance was relatively easy.⁶⁵

The agriculture activity of the ancient Nile community did, however, have at least one drawback: It attracted foreign conquerors. Egypt, until 1952, had, in fact, been under 2500 years of foreign domination including Persians, Greeks, Romans, Circassians, Arabs, Turks, and finally the British. Each of these conquerors certainly left some of their own culture to blend with that of Egypt. The Arabs, however, profoundly altered the social institutions of the country. Arab soldiers first raided the Nile Delta in 639 A.D. By 641, they had seized control from the occupying Byzantine forces and established a permanent camp at Al Fustat, present day Cairo. In a relatively brief two and three centuries, the Arab-Islamic culture had all but supplanted

the traditional-Coptic social structure. This Arab-Islamic social and religious order continued through the domination of the Turks and the British. Today, the country is officially an Arab nation with Islam being the national religion.⁶⁶

This brief, highlighted, geosocial/geopolitical background, exerts its influence on the modern security problems and policies arising out of Egypt's geographical features. Unlike previous conquerors who were attracted by agricultural abundance or were using Egypt as a bridge to reach further destinations, the British valued Egypt only for its strategic geographic position. This time period, characterized by the above mentioned contrast in goals, and a globally awakening world is a logical place to begin.⁶⁷

In the closing years of the eighteenth century, Egypt was under the loose suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans, however, did not have the strength nor the inclination to deny access to the forces of Napoleon Bonaparte of France in 1798. France, for her part, was not primarily after Ottoman territory. Rather, her invasion of Egypt was a strategic ploy aimed at the British Empire. She hoped to restrict the easy movement and commercial links from Great Britain to Asia and, in turn, enhance her own position with respect to Asia. In the same year they arrived, the French fleet was destroyed by British seapower, and finally in 1801 the remainder of the French forces were routed out of Egypt by combined British and Turkish forces. The importance here should not be placed on the expulsion of the French, but on the fact that Egypt, because of her geographic position, was thrust into the geopolitics of Europe.⁶⁸

To Britain, the Middle East was simply a bridge to her Asian Empire, albeit an extremely weak bridge which required constant British maintenance. The Ottoman Empire controlling Russia's access to the sea at the Turkish Straits and checking the Czar's historical desire to expand southward, was constantly supported by Great Britain. By infusing strength into the Ottomans, the British were able to protect the routes to Asia through the Middle East. The acquisition of Cyprus by the British and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, however, changed the security policy of Great Britain and their primary communication routes to the East. It was no longer so important to prop up the Ottomans. The concentration of the British shifted to Egypt and Suez. Keeping the canal open, in fact, became an overriding principle of the trade-dependent Empire. When, in 1882, antforeign riots led by Arabi Pasha threaten the safety of British interests, specifically the canal, Britain occupied the Nile Delta ostensibly to restore peace. But the British soon extended their military domination throughout the Nile Valley and into the Sudan.⁶⁹

Believing that her very economic life depended upon it, Britain clung to Egypt, the Suez Canal and her influential position throughout the Middle East even after her Asian Empire had all but disappeared.

The Zenith of British influence in Egypt was during World War I. With her Empire still intact but severely threatened, Britain, ignoring Ottoman sovereignty, claimed to be the protector of Egypt. Almost immediately after the war, however, British control was to be seriously questioned. Nationalistic urgings were maturing within Egypt in opposition to British rule and military presence.⁷⁰

In an effort to placate these nationalist movements, the British, in 1922, declared Egypt, with certain selfserving reservations, to be independent. Great Britain, to insure her geographic advantage in Egypt, insisted upon, among other things, the secure communications of the British Empire in Egypt and the right to protect Egypt against foreign aggression. Without complete sovereignty, the various nationalists would not be stilled. The Egyptian position was softened, however, when the Italians imposed their rule on Ethiopia. The need for British military presence to deter the ambitious Mussolini, for the time being, outweighed their political aspirations. Thus, on August 26, 1936, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty was signed recognizing Britain's vital interest in the Suez Canal and her right to protect this most crucial of the world's waterways.⁷¹

The strengthening forces of nationalism following World War II proved to be far too powerful for the weakened British to control effectively. Great Britain tried desperately to facilitate an agreement which would satisfy the nationalistic ambitions of the Egyptians while allowing the British to protect her commercial and military interests in the Canal Zone. This time, the security of the Canal was not the stumbling block to an agreement. The impasse was caused by Egyptian claims in the Sudan. The central consideration here was the Nile, Egypt's vital waterway. The Egyptians were afraid that if they had no say in the political processes in the Sudan, that it was conceivable that the life-giving Nile waters could be denied to Egypt. This geographical problem, from the Egyptian point of view, was one of strategic national interest. As a consequence, the Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese difficulties continued until February 12, 1953, when it was

agreed that the Sudan would enjoy self-determination after a three year transitional period. On October 19 of the same year, the final agreement on the disposition of the Canal was signed. Under this agreement, British troops were to completely evacuate Egypt, but Britain retained the right to reintroduce military strength into the canal zone in the event of war.⁷²

Although it seemed that Egypt was to take charge of her own security policy for the first time in many years, she could not escape the fact that her position kept her in the midst of world geopolitics. As Egypt was wrestling free of British suzerainty, the so-called cold war between the world's "free" countries, championed by the United States and the Russian-led communist world, was dominating the security planning of all of the world's powers. And, as could be expected of the strategically situated Egypt, she was soon the fulcrum of the cold war.

Egypt, traditionally identified with Western political ideology, was moving under the leadership of Gamal Abd Al Nasser to neutralism. The Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact, for instance, was opposed by Nasser because of the likelihood of the Pact drawing the Arab world into an "imperialistic" war. This political shift toward neutrality on the part of Egypt was distressing to the United States but consistent with Soviet policy goals.⁷³

2. Modern Geosecurity Issues

Superimposed on the cold war politics of the Middle East and Egypt was the Arab-Israeli conflict. On February 28, 1955, the Egyptians suffered an embarrassing defeat in the Gaza Strip, as their headquarters were raided by the Israelis. In the long term, this raid is only important because it precipitated arms shopping by Nasser. He naturally

turned to the West, Washington specifically, for his desired purchase. When Egypt was refused weapons by the United States, she concluded the now famous Czeck arms deal. The West immediately had visions of the communication routes and energy reserves of the Middle East being controlled by the communists. The Russians, on the other hand, hoped that they had outflanked the Baghdad Pact. One result of this situation was that the Egyptian-Israeli regional conflict was taking the appearance of surrogate world war.⁷⁴

While the actual battles seeking territorial conquest and control were of genuine concern in terms of superpower geopolitics, they represented crucial geostrategy to the regional contenders, in this case, Egypt and Israel. There have been four major confrontations between these two Middle Eastern nations and they all resulted from geographic determinants. The proximity of the Egyptian border to Israel's critical areas places Israel in an extremely insecure position militarily (i.e. Tel Aviv is 130 kilometers from the Egyptian border). In the 1956 and 1967 wars, the Israeli strategy, vis-a-vis Egypt, was to carve a buffer out of Egyptian territory. In both cases, Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula. The net effect here was to place Cairo only 130 kilometers from the military forces of Israel. Hence, Egypt was placed in an insecure position, vis-a-vis Israel. The effect of such a positional disadvantage on an economically developing country such as Egypt could be catastrophic. Her security objectives were forcibly changed to compensate for the loss of the Sinai. Egypt had to devote more resources to her armed forces. She had to increase the strength and efficiency of these forces while acquiring modern sophisticated weapons without unacceptable political compromises. And, most importantly, Egypt had

recover the Sinai.⁷⁵ It could even be argued, rather well in fact, that this economic hardship and military insecurity led to the Egyptian armed forces crossing the Canal in October of 1973. President Sadat had good reason to believe that the superpowers would not let either side gain too great of a military advantage. But he also probably believed that he could only improve his security position.⁷⁶

Another move by Sadat, possibly caused in part by his country's insecurity, vis-a-vis Israel, was to bring his policies more closely parallel to the influential political and economic powers of the area (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Iran). The assumption here was that the United States would not pressure Israel into an equitable settlement because the Arabs had brought the Russians into the Middle East. So it was concluded that if Egypt followed the lead of the anti-communist Saudis and Iranians, the Americans would no longer be dependent on the Israelis as a balance in the Middle East and would, therefore, be free to shape a Pax Americana. The net result of this Egyptian policy shift was the abrogation, on May 5, 1976, of their treaty with the Soviets.⁷⁷

The most recent product of Egypt's foreign/security policy was the peace treaty with Israel. Unfortunately for Egypt, the unofficial alliance with which she had cast her security policy was falling apart. With the demise of the Shah's regime in Iran, it seems evident that Iran (and possibly Saudi Arabia) have been moving away from their close association with the United States. Egypt has, consequently, been left without any regional support.⁷⁸


In summary, it seems clear that the history of Egypt is the child of geography. Egypt became a nation largely because of the Nile. She could contribute her early success as a unified nation to her unique geographical environment. In the modern world, the strategic geographical position of Egypt controlling access to the Middle East's communication routes caused her many years of foreign domination. Even after winning her freedom, she could not escape superpower influences. Executing a security policy seeking territorial integrity, political independence and national defense proved to be extremely difficult. The superpowers sought influence in Egypt because of her strategic geographical position. Israel's territorial conquests into Egypt were designed to grant geographical security. And, in contemporary times, Egypt is seeking security for her two critical areas, the Nile Valley and Delta and the Suez Canal. To that end, her attempts to pacify her border with Israel have been central. She cannot ignore the possibility of threats coming from other quarters but she can depend on her vast deserted lands to afford a degree of protection.

As for Russia and the United States involved in the Continental World-Maritime World struggle, their interest in Egypt has always been one of geography. When any of the Soviet leaders speak of the Middle East, they usually mention their "legitimate interests" based on geographic proximity.⁷⁹ The recent importance of Middle Eastern oil has only served to heighten the interest of Russia, the United States and every other major oil-consuming nation in Egypt's vital position.

Israel

- International boundary
- - - Armistice line
- Railroad
- Surfaced road

0 25 50 Kilometers
0 25 50 Miles



BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITY

III. ISRAEL

A. HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING

If, as has been stated, the Middle East is the world's crossroads, Israel would seem to be the point of convergence. To be sure, she connects, along with Egypt, the Asian continent with Africa and borders both the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea (see map p. 44). But in a less tangible sense, though equally real, Israel has become the focal point of the region's geo-politics. When modern Israel was established in Palestine, at a time when indigenous nationalism was growing into maturity, she was the embodiment of western imperialism and, therefore, insecurity to her surrounding Arab neighbors. The net result of Palestine's geographic location to the Zionist movement was that Israel was born into a hostile environment. Her geographic position left the defense strategists with a seemingly impossible problem.⁸⁰

Historical events of the Jewish peoples and Palestine must be recounted in order to understand the geographical security position of modern Israel.

From the beginning the close relationship of geography and history is inseparable. Establishing the Zionist movement and connecting it with Palestine is rooted to the very beginning of Jewish history. Biblical texts tell of Abraham, the oldest of the Jewish patriarchs, leading his people into Canaan, later known as both Israel and Palestine. These Semitic migrations are thought to have occurred about

2000 B.C. and in Jewish theology gave rise to the "Chosen People" belief. In Genesis 12, it is related that Abraham received a divine covenant granting the land to the Jews: "...Unto thy seed will I give this land..."⁸¹

There was a later migration of the Jewish peoples into Egypt (probably in the 18th century B.C.) where they remained, according to Jewish tradition, for 400 years. Probably during the reign of Pharoah Rameses II (c. 1304-1237 B.C.) they left Egypt under the leadership of Moses seeking the land promised to Abraham in Genesis 17⁸²: "...And I will give to you and to your descendants after you, the land of your sojournings, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession..." Further historical or biblical identification of the Jewish people with the land of Israel is ascribed in Numbers 33:

...And the Lord said to Moses in the plains of Moab by the Jordan at Jericho, "Say to the people of Israel, When you pass over the Jordan into the land of Canaan, then you shall drive out all the inhabitants of the land from before you, and destroy all their figured stones, and destroy all their molten images, and demolish all their high places; and you shall take possession of the land and settle in it, for I have given the land to you to possess it..."

The Jewish nation did become a state and flourished until 722 B.C. when the northern half fell to the Assyrians. The southern half fell about a century later to the Babylonians. Both of the conquerors deported thousands of the Jews as slaves. Those remaining in Palestine lost their identity as a nation.⁸³

The Jewish community was maintained by some of those in captivity in Babylon until Cyrus II of Persia defeated the Babylonians in 539 B.C. and allowed voluntary return of the Jews to their "Promised Land."

Palestine passed from Persian control to that of the Greeks and subsequently to the Romans. Under the Roman emperor, Hadrian (A.D. 117-138), the Jews were again repressed. Seeking cultural uniformity, Hadrian forbade the Jews from following their traditional ways and later dispersed them throughout the known world. The religion, literature and culture survived in Dispura but the Jewish way of life was all but extinct in Palestine.⁸⁴

In 1882, three Zionist colonies, Rishon le Zion in Judea, Zichron Jacob in Samaria, and Rosh Pina in Galilee, were established in Palestine beginning anew the quest for a Jewish homeland.⁸⁵ These settlements were the vanguard of what has come to be called the First Aliyah - the first immigration wave. The catalysts for this demographic movement were many, but principal among them were increased anti-Semitic trends in Europe coupled with the financial backing and expertise of Baron Edmond de Rothchild and the leadership of the internationally reknown writer, Theodor Herzl. (Herzl's book, Der Judenstaat published in Vienna in 1896, spread the idea of Zionism throughout Europe).⁸⁶

A second wave of immigration started arriving in Palestine in 1904 driven by the mass pogroms in Kishinev and Gomel in Russia. By the outbreak of World War I, there were eighty-five thousand Jews in the "Promised Land." However, the possibility of a Jewish state in Palestine seemed very remote, indeed. In the first place, the land being inhabited by the Jewish immigrants was the sovereign property of the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, the indigenous Arab residents were beginning to feel nationalistic tendencies of their own and were not prepared to give up what they considered their own land to Europeans.⁸⁷

World events probably more than personalities allowed the Jewish state movement to gain political power. The Ottoman Empire was allied with Germany against, among others, Great Britain in World War I. At a time when the war was not going well for the British they were willing to, and in fact did, make contradictory bargains with both the Jews and Arabs in order to enlist aid in the fight against Germany. Mindful of the eternal geographic importance of the Middle East to the Arabs, the British promised postwar support for independence. The territorial boundaries of state were not explicitly defined but the Arabs were certain that it included all of Palestine.⁸⁸

Meanwhile, the political leverage gained by explosives expert, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, through his potential value to the British war effort won Great Britain's support for the Zionist movement. The British government officially promised to view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. Concerning this home, in what has come to be known as the Balfour Declaration the British stated in a simple letter from the foreign secretary, Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, a leading British Zionist, the following:

"Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the cabinet: 'His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.' I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.⁸⁹

Following the war, Great Britain was made the Mandatory Power for Palestine. Under the terms of the Mandate the historical connection between the Jewish people and the land of Palestine was recognized. The pledges made by the British during the war years to the Arabs and to the Jews were, however, mutually exclusive. In fact, the Balfour Declaration, itself, contained contradictory ideas. How could a "Jewish National Home" be created in Palestine without prejudicing the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities - especially considering that these communities comprised nearly 92 percent of the Palestinian population? The central point here is that the Arabs of Palestine were very apprehensive about the newly established national home of the Jews. As the immigration into Palestine increased the apprehension increased.⁹⁰

The mass immigrations forced by Hitler's Germany only worsened Britain's mandate problems. The Arabs becoming more and more anxious because of what they perceived as a seizure of political power by the Zionists declared a general strike. The Peel Commission, dispatched in response to the strike, found the differences between the Arabs and Zionists to be irreconcilable and Great Britain's position between the two as untenable.⁹¹

World War II delayed the inevitable. But after many commissions, studies and conferences the British government announced in February 1947 that the problem would be turned over to the United Nations. On the 14th of May 1948 the British lowered the Union Jack in Jerusalem and the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel was read by David Ben-Gurion.⁹²


B. ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICTS

Geographic determinants existed from the day Israel was born. The new Jewish state immediately had security problems which threatened its very survival. Israel, on its first day of official existence, was invaded by a combined Arab army. (The invading force consisted of approximately 10,000 Egyptians, 4,500 Arab Legionnaires, 7,000 Syrians, 8,000 Iraqis, and 3,000 Lebanese). The Israelis had roughly 30,000 troops to defend their ill defined country. These forces - nine brigades - were carefully allocated to defend what the Israelis thought to be their critical areas.⁹³ Three of the brigades were designated to protect the north. Two were held in the central coastal plain to guard Tel Aviv. Two more were dispatched against the Egyptian threat - one in Rehovot Isdend and another in the northern Negev. And, finally, to protect the Holy City, a brigade was designated to protect Jerusalem and another for the highway in the Jerusalem Corridor.⁹⁴

Thus, the defensive deployments were designed to protect two main geographical areas. First, the coastal plain and its burgeoning new city, Tel Aviv. With a swelling population of over a quarter-million, Tel Aviv housed nearly three times the Jewish population of New Jerusalem and was perhaps the Middle East's most technologically advanced city. The survival of this city in the Palestine War or the War of Independence was tantamount to the survival of the young state.⁹⁵

Jerusalem was the other key element to be defended. The historical identification of the Jewish people was inextricably tied to the Holy City. The term, "Zionism", is said to have originated, after all, from a poem written by a Hebrew who was forced into Babylonian slavery.

Jerusalem-Holy Places



He wrote of his longing to return to Jerusalem and Mt. Zion (see map p. 51).⁹⁶

Another fundamental element in the defense of Israel and the eventual determinants of Israel's international borders was the kibbutzim. These agricultural villages had literally been staking out the Jewish claim to the Palestinian territory for over 60 years prior to the 1948 war. The area and shape of Israel, until June 1967, was largely a result of the kibbutzim's location. These colonies, most importantly, performed a semi-military role. They acted as a defensive picket line preventing or at least signaling enemy invasion or infiltration. A secondary and passive role of these settlements was offering a means of dispersing the population. Specifically, the kibbutz gave Israel a place to send new immigrants, thus preventing concentration in the central plain and demographic insecurity.⁹⁷

The war was extremely taxing on the economics and resources of all the contenders. Compounding the difficulties of the Arab side, the individual nations were pursuing different goals. The Syrians, for instance, were principally attempting to settle territorial claims against Palestine which were lingering since the 1919-20 Paris Peace Conference. King Abdullah of Transjordan, on the other hand, was interested in controlling Jerusalem. By so doing, he could regain some of the stature lost from his Hashimite family when his father surrendered Mecca and Medina to the Saudis in 1925. This lack of central effort and leadership coupled with the economic ramifications served to frustrate the Arab cause or causes.⁹⁸


Gaza Strip

- International boundary
- Armistice line
- All-weather road
- Railroad
- Airfield
- Israeli settlement
- UNRWA refugee camp

5 Miles
5 Kilometers



Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula



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Israel for her part was, as stated above, severely strained by her War of Independence. But, she was contradistinguished from her Arab enemies by her singleness of purpose. Israel was fighting for her independence and, in fact, her very existence.⁹⁹

In December of 1948, Israeli forces drove the Egyptians into the narrow Gaza Strip (see maps p. 53-54) and started into the Egyptian Sinai. To preserve their territorial integrity the Egyptians asked for a cease fire. The subsequent armistice between Israel and Egypt established a temporary frontier separating the two. Egypt retained the Gaza Strip but the arbitrary lines kept many Arab villages from their farmlands.¹⁰⁰

An armistice between Israel and Lebanon recognized the pre-war frontier and demilitarized each side. The Syrian boundary took a while to be settled but finally ended as they were drawn in 1920 - the Sea of Galilee and the upper Jordan remain, for the most part, in Israel. The exception was the Lake Hulah marsh which became a demilitarized zone.¹⁰¹

The frontier with Transjordan was perhaps the most difficult to settle. The western powers in the United Nation debates agreed that King Abdullah should annex the remainder of Arab Palestine. Israel, however, was unwilling to give up the Negev. The demarcation finally agreed upon, like the one in Gaza, separated Arab farmers from their land.¹⁰²

Having successfully defended herself, Israel now had the luxury to reflect on future geographic security policy. She ignored the cease fire arrangement in Jerusalem and later the armistice with Egypt to

push south hoping to gain access to the Gulf of Aqaba. Such a position would permit Israel to bypass the Suez Canal and open a route to the Orient. For a country so recently struggling for its very survival, this acquisition of the port (now known as Eilat) was very sophisticated geographical security policy indeed.¹⁰³

In May 1948, following the Rhodes Armistice agreements, Israel gained membership in the United Nations thus achieving status as a sovereign nation. Her international borders were defined by the Rhodes Armistice demarcation line. However, these boundaries, as mentioned above, were in places thoughtlessly delineated and were, consequently, the source of nearly constant conflict. Israel, in fact, shared 600 miles of frontier with avowedly hostile neighboring states. Occupying only 8000 square miles, she could not rely on territorial depth for defense. Only in the Negev could an Israeli citizen withdraw more than 20 miles from an Arab border. Contributing to her vulnerability, Jordan would only have to move 9 to 10 miles toward the Mediterranean Sea to cut Israel in half. Or, in a coordinated attack, Egypt and Jordan would only have to move approximately 25 miles to sever the Negev and the strategically important Eilat from the remainder of the country.¹⁰⁴

The corridor to Jerusalem narrowed at points to only 10 miles and the Jewish Quarter of the city was surrounded by hills and could easily be menaced by Jordanian artillery. Syrian artillery, likewise, threatened settlements in Galilee from their positions on the Golan Heights.¹⁰⁵ The security situation of Israel was probably best summed by Moshe Dayan:

The area of the country is only 8,100 square miles. But owing to the configuration of its territory there are 400 miles of frontier. Three-quarters of the population of Israel lives in the coastal plain...The country's main roads and railways are exposed to swift and easy incursion. Scarcely anywhere in Israel can a man live or work beyond the easy range of enemy fire...

Thus the term frontier security has little meaning in the context of Israel's geography. The entire country is a frontier, and the whole rhythm of national life is affected by any hostile activity from the territory of neighboring states.¹⁰⁶

Parenthetically, there is a significant difference between the 600 mile border sighted above and the 400 miles mentioned by Moshe Dayan. At the time of independence the Israeli boundaries were as follows: 49 miles with Lebanon in the north; 47 miles with Syria in the northeast; 332 miles with Jordan and 165 miles shared with Egypt. The total was then 593 miles.

In demographic terms, the surrounding Arabs populations outnumbered Israel's by forty to one, and the proportion of uniformed fighting men was eight to one in favor of the Arabs. And from the Israeli point of view the Arabs were seeking to manifest their geographic advantage and population superiority in the complete destruction of Israel as an independent state. Thus, Israel perceived herself as being extremely vulnerable and this vulnerability was and is a pre-occupation in her security policy formation.¹⁰⁷

It did not take long after the Arab-Israeli General Armistice Agreements went into effect in 1949 before they began to unravel. The Arabs emphasized those parts of the agreements which stated that the demarcation lines were not to be construed in any way as political or territorial boundaries. Israel countered by stressing that the Arab economic boycott against her was an illegal act of war. As time

passed, Israel began to claim that the demarcation lines were, in fact, legal borders and the demilitarized zones were part of her sovereign territory.¹⁰⁸

The hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees created by the war were also a continuing source of animosity. Egypt and Lebanon, for instance, already had an overpopulation problem and were unable to easily absorb those fleeing Israel. Many would attempt to reenter their homeland only to be shot or expelled as infiltrators by the Israelis. Some of the refugees did in truth reenter with terrorist objectives which started a vicious cycle of retaliations. Before too long these border incidents and retaliatory raids were very much official policy being carried out by regular military units.¹⁰⁹

More and more the Arab leadership was speaking of a "second round" in which Israel would be pushed into the sea. Meanwhile, Israel's leaders, especially those of the Herut Party - were insisting upon expansion to take Akaba, all of Palestine and even Transjordan. In sum, both sides felt threatened by the other; they completely distrusted one another and unfortunately were both quite inflexible in policy toward the other.¹¹⁰

The large amounts of Czech or "Soviet bloc" arms going to Egypt in 1955 started a chain of events which proved impossible to stop short of war. The apparent move of Egypt toward Russia in the cold war atmosphere caused the United States to withdraw financial support from Nasser's Aswan dam project. Nasser, in response, nationalized the Suez Canal. In order to protect interests in the Suez, Britain

and France, in turn, started a heavy military buildup on Cyprus. Nasser countered the British and French by moving 60,000 men and her large weapons to protect Cairo and Alexandria. The net result was that the Sinai and Gaza were left practically without armed security.¹¹¹

As the region's military situation was altered by the Suez Canal nationalization, Israel felt that she was near an impasse with her military and economic situation vis-a-vis the Arab world. The fedayeen raids were becoming increasingly numerous and violent; with the large arms imports into Egypt the military balance was shifting; and her commerce through the Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba was severed. Additionally, with Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran closed to her shipping, Israel's oil supply lines were interrupted - an act directly threatening her security.¹¹²

The recourse was to initiate a "preventive war." Israel had warned in July of 1955 that she would use force if Egypt sought to restrict or hamper the flow of essential goods to Eilat. Thus, Israel's main objective in launching the war was to ensure free transit through the Gulf of Aqaba. She also hoped to destroy fedayeen bases and some of Egypt's newly acquired weapons. Additionally, it was Israel's desire to take conquered Egyptian territory to the bargaining table to barter for a lasting peace settlement on her own terms.¹¹³

With British and French support, the Israelis resorted to war. The campaign was, from the Israeli point of view, well executed and the military objectives were acquired. Few of the political objectives, however, became reality. The Suez Canal remained closed to Israel;

United Nations intervention prevented her from using the conquered territory as the desired political lever; Egypt's arms stockpiles were replenished by Russia and captured British materials; and the border problems continued. However, Israeli shipping through the Strait of Tiran and Aqaba to Eilat was restored thus assuring the geographical advantages of that southern port.¹¹⁴

The war of 1956, usually designated as the Sinai war did very little to change the attitudes and strategic positions between the Arabs and Israelis. If there was a change, it was probably that relations became more hostile. Border infiltrations by the Palestinian refugees steadily grew in frequency and organization. A small militant group known as al-Fatah composed of young Palestinians familiar with Israeli territory spearheaded this new wave of terrorist activity. Although al-Fatah selected targets carefully and usually chose to interrupt Israeli water projects their primary goal was to keep alive emotional attachments of the refugees to their homeland.¹¹⁵

From the Israeli point of view, the incessant al-Fatah raids served ✓ to exemplify their geographic security problems - the lack of depth, and long, difficult to defend frontiers. Israel, on the other hand, raised the ire of the Arabs, particularly the Syrians, by trying to agriculturally develop contested territory. On the 7th of April 1967, perhaps the most serious of these clashes took place. From Israel's perception, the Syrians opened fire on an "unarmed" tractor working on "Israeli lands." The Syrians, of course, saw the circumstances a little differently. She claimed that the Israelis sent an "armed" tractor on "disputed" lands and opened fire on Syrian positions. The

truth is not as important as the results. What started with small arms fire escalated to an artillery and mortar duel. Finally, before a cease-fire was arranged by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), Israeli jets strafed and bombed Syrian positions and caused extensive property damage and loss of life. As a consequence, the Arab countries closed ranks and pledged support for Syria.¹¹⁶

As the border situation between Syria and Israel became more tense, Syria indicated that she would invoke her defense treaty with Egypt. Nasser and his Arab leadership, as an exhibit of solidarity, on May 15, 1967, placed the Egyptian armed forces on alert. With United Nations Emergency Forces in position in the Sinai, the alert was a meaningless demonstration. Nasser, therefore, on the following day asked the U.N. to remove their forces and he began a buildup in the Sinai with his own troops. Now in a position to again stop Israeli shipping Egypt was under extreme pressure from her Arab neighbors to prevent Israel's ships from passing through the Strait of Tiran. Nasser announced the closure on May 22.¹¹⁷

Another strategic development which threatened the security of Israel took place on 30 May 1967. King Hussein of Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt. Under the agreement the Jordanian forces were placed under the command of the Egyptian, Major-General Abdul Munim Riad. Also, Iraqi and other Arab troops were allowed on Jordanian soil. Israel's defense depended, in part, on quick mobility from one frontier to another in order to meet the attacking enemy with the maximum force. Having the Arab armies under a unified command made a multi-fronted war a greater possibility, thus weakening

Israel's strategic posture. On the third of June the Israeli cabinet voted overwhelmingly in favor of launching a "preventive war."¹¹⁸

It would be difficult to cite which one event or combination of events caused the Israelis to go to war. But, many observers and analysts believe that the Arab attempt to neutralize the geographical advantages of the Red Sea port at Eilat galvanized Israel into action. Premier Eshkol called the blockade an act of aggression. The loss of free navigation to and from Eilat connecting Israel to her markets in Japan and the rest of Asia, and to the Persian Gulf oil was so threatening to her security and survival that Israel declared that she would fight rather than let Nasser cut her communications routes.¹¹⁹

Also, concerning Israel's motivations for waging a preventive war Edgar O'Ballance in his book, The Third Arab-Israeli War, stated the following:

"...My considered opinion is that the closing of the Straits of Tiran and the attempted strangulation of the southern port of Eilat made war certain. ...The Israeli Government's reaction to the closure of the Straits of Tiran was one of shock and anxiety. Premier Eshkol took the unusual step of consulting leaders of opposition parties..."¹²⁰

The restriction placed on the viability of Eilat was cited before as a principal cause of the 1956 Sinai War. This decision by Israel to go to war was an example of security policy dictated by geographic concerns. The June 1967 War was even a more flamboyant example of such a policy. By attacking and militarily defeating their Arab antagonists Israel hoped not only to reassert their position in Eilat, but to also correct geographic related security problems on nearly all frontiers.

Initially, the policy goals were probably limited to stopping terrorist raids and border conflicts; to destroying as much military capability of the confronting Arab armies as possible; to opening crucial sealanes; and to forcing a peace settlement with her Arab neighbors. However, the Israeli policy goals became more ambitious as their military successes grew.¹²¹

Israel, in the Six Day War, conquered territories nearly six times her own size and, by so doing, altered significantly her geo-security situation. By occupying Sinai she completely reversed her strategic position vis-a-vis Egypt. Egypt and Jordan could no longer easily unite their forces and sever Israel at the waist. Tel Aviv was now some 300 miles from Egypt's armed forces. And as Tel Aviv and the rest of Israel gained in security because of the Sinai buffer Egypt became more vulnerable.¹²²

A similar reverse in strategic positioning was enjoyed by Israel on the Golan Heights. By winning control of the heights, Israel removed many of her citizens from their hostage position under Syrian artillery. She also gained a commanding position over the coveted head waters of the Jordan River and moved her military to within 40 miles of the Syrian capital of Damascus. Perhaps the most important aspect of the victory on the Golan to Israel's security was that Syria was denied an easy invasion route.¹²³

Jordan also lost strategic positioning to Israel. With the West Bank now being occupied by Israel, key Jordanian bases and staging areas were neutralized. Amman, Jordan's capital, like Cairo and Damascus, also became more vulnerable to Israeli air power. (Israel's new frontiers were 25 miles from Amman).¹²⁴

Israeli officials were quick to let it be known that they would handle the newly occupied lands according to their own security dictates. The government clearly intended to hold on to the conquered lands until peace was guaranteed. In short, land was to be bartered for security. The Sinai clearly fell into this category. Prime Minister Rabin concisely stated Israel's geographic security consideration in the Sinai as follows:

"I am in favor of making far reaching concessions, particularly in the Egyptian sector, in return for peace...I have neither an historical attachment, nor any other attachment to Sinai. For me Sinai is mainly a card for bargaining in order to achieve peace, or in order to achieve a significant move toward peace, and it is worthwhile to yield for the sake of peace.

In the absence of peace, Sinai provides us with strategic depth and the ability to defend ourselves against the largest and strongest of the Arab states."¹²⁵

Portions of the conquered lands, however, were not to be placed on the bargaining table. Jerusalem, for example, was considered a part of Israel and definitely not a bargaining item. When defense minister Moshe Dayan entered Old Jerusalem shortly after its capture he announced, "We have returned to all that is holy in our land. We have returned never to be parted from it again."¹²⁶

The acquisition and incorporation of the Old City was accomplished primarily because of historical and religious identification. The Golan Heights, however, was incorporated because of its security implications. Concerning this area Prime Minister Rabin said, "...As for the Golan Heights, my view is that even in return for peace, the State of Israel cannot, from a security point of view come down from the Golan Heights."¹²⁷ Thus, the disposition of the captured territory

became a vivid example of security policies arising from geography. In this example, though, Israel had the unique ability to alter both the policy and the geography.

As a geo-strategic overview, the 1967 war greatly altered Israel's position. Although increasing her area, the land borders of Israel were reduced by more than one-third. The boundary with Jordan was now only 50 miles while that with Egypt went from 165 to a mere 60 miles. The new frontiers tended to follow natural boundaries. The barrier between Egypt and Israel became the Suez Canal; the Jordan River because of Israel's conquests became the defacto demarcation between Jordan and Israel; and finally, the promontory position enjoyed by Syria on the Golan Heights was reversed when the war redefined the frontier between Syria and Israel.¹²⁸

Although the hostilities won some of Israel's security objectives, ✓ she did not achieve space. She increased her defensive depth and military maneuvering area; she destroyed Arab armaments and military equipment; and she regained access to the southern sea lanes. But, the Arabs apparently were unwilling to settle their differences with Israel in exchange for the return of their captured lands. The surprise and humiliation suffered by the Arab armies seemed only to heighten their hatred and resolve. Hasanaya Haikal, editor of Cairo's daily, Al-Ahram, verbalized the Arab's feelings thusly:

"There is one Arab nation which lives on a territory stretching from the Arab Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean and numbers 100 million souls. The unity of this nation is not a subject for debate...At the heart of this nation a foreign unit has been formed, in the shape of a sharp-angled triangle...this triangle separates the eastern Arab territory and peoples from the western Arab territory and peoples...In this way, Israel's geographic location forms an artificial island...in the midst of the Arab ocean. This situation cannot persist no matter what extraordinary resources are supplied.

The waves on both sides will continue to beat against this artificial island and in the course of time will wear it down until it breaks and falls apart and is swept away in the mighty expanse of the ocean."¹²⁹

The attitude exemplified by Haikal's writing characterized the interim between the 1967 war and the October war of 1973. This period was not unlike the previous interim periods which were typified by terrorist activity with Israeli retaliations. Perhaps the geo-strategic change was that the Israelis rushed to build kibbutzim on the captured land in order to fully enjoy the protective security of their new territorial depth.

The October War, in fact, did very little to alter the geo-strategic situation. The frontier shared with Egypt was forced eastward and Egypt again controlled both sides of the canal. However, the coordinated attack by Egypt and Syria was strategically important to Israel for other reasons. The long standing policy of facing one enemy at a time was dealt a serious blow by the well rehearsed, simultaneous attacks by the two Arab antagonists. The latest war convinced many in Israel that their survival depended upon holding the captured lands. They reasoned that an Israel with pre-1967 borders would not have survived the attack.¹³⁰

Another strategically important development arising out of the October War was again centered on Israel's access to the searoutes via the Red Sea. Just as Nasser had used Sharm al-Sheikh in 1967 to stop Israeli shipping at the Strait of Tiran, Sadat sought to embargo Israeli trade at the Bab al-Mandeb Strait near the mouth of the Red Sea. Egypt leased the island of Perim from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen from which to command the strait. The embargo was

not in force long enough to be telling and it was overshadowed by the struggle in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. However, it did dramatize the continued geographic vulnerability of Israel.¹³¹

C. CURRENT GEOSSECURITY ISSUE AREAS

1. Internal Divisions


Surely the major security problem facing Israeli leadership since the 1973 War has been and is finding a peaceful solution, an accord if you will, with the Arab world. How can Israel continue to exist as a Jewish state with desired security and prosperity while surrounded by nations bent on its destruction; this is the problem. The correct path toward obtaining these economic, political and religious security goals, in essence the security of the state, is of course a subject of great debate in Israel's policy-making process. Looking into this process is beyond the scope of this research but the author will look briefly into two general suggested solutions: (1) the peace movement and (2) the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel) movement.¹³²

The ideological basis of both of these above mentioned movements deal with the disposition of the lands captured in the 1967 June War. The peace movement is basically in favor of Israel making concessions to their Arab neighbors in order to achieve a lasting peace settlement. These concessions are mainly meant to be the return of captured Arab lands compensated by security guarantees. There are two major problems which have prohibited any cohesion in this movement. The first difficulty is determining what borders are acceptable to Israel. How much land can be given back and still permit Israel to maintain her security should bartered peace treaties break down? The second problem is that

any concession requires Arab cooperation. Unilateral action on the part of Israel is simply out of the question. Thus, without Arab participation the only specifics this movement can support is that Israel should return to borders roughly equivalent to those which existed prior to the June War. Such a concession would be agreed upon in return for assurances of nonbelligerency from the major Arab nations. In spite of the problem areas noted it is important to point out that virtually all major political groups in Israel are willing to return to June 4, 1967 borders in exchange for security guarantees.¹³³

On the other end of the argument is the Land of Israel Movement. The security stance envisioned by this group is simply to retain all occupied lands. In the long run, they want these lands to be formally and legally brought into the Israeli state. Their hard line position is based on a gambit of justifications ranging from national security goals to divine right. Although the Land of Israel Movement is not widely embraced there have been extensive Jewish settlement activity in all of the occupied areas.¹³⁴

Central government policies concerning the captured lands is more in line with that of the peace movement. Although these policies are constrained and influenced by the problems cited above and the more radical politics of the Land of Israel Movement. They reflect the security strategy of Israel - a strategy based largely on geography. Looking at the captured territories one at a time, the contemporary geo-politics of Israel will be examined.



Sinai Peninsula

— All-weather road

— Unsurfaced road or vehicle track

— Railroad

— Airfield

— Port

— Mine

○ City

● Town or village

◆ Israeli settlement

▲ Resort area

▲ Oilfield

◆ POL offshore loading buoy

10 100

(Bathymetry in Gulf of Aqaba is approximate)

Lambert Conformal Conic Projection
Standard Parallels 28°15' N and 30°50' N
Spot elevations in meters

20 40 Kilometers

20 40 Miles


2. The Sinai Peninsula

Turning first to the Sinai peninsula, Israel had cut the invasion routes through the coastal passageway and the Mitla and Gidi Passes far forward at the Suez Canal in the Six Day War of 1967. The Suez line was breached, however, by Egypt in the October War. Israel, subsequently, withdrew in January 1974 in the "first step" Disengagement Agreement (see map p. 69). The best fall-back position was, of course, the occupation of the passes. These, however, were given up in the "second step" of September 1975. Consequently, Israel through airpower, sought to keep the Sinai free of Egyptian military power - the Sinai became a buffer.¹³⁵ So, Israel's security does not depend upon an occupied Sinai, but a demilitarized Sinai. This view was reflected during the Camp David talks in the fall of 1978 when Israel expressed a willingness to almost totally withdraw and return the peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty in return for guarantees of demilitarization northeast of the Gidi and Mitla Passes.¹³⁶ (Israel also wanted assured access to the Gulf of Aqaba, but this pre-occupation diminished greatly when during the October War they saw that their shipping was vulnerable as far south as the Bab al-Mandeb. Being beyond their power projection capabilities, Israel had to depend on retaliation or third power intervention to gain freedom of the seas.¹³⁷

3. The Golan Heights

The situation on the Golan Heights differs from that in the Sinai. Syria was prevented from shelling Israeli settlements in the Huleh Valley only by Israel's occupation of the Golan. And, compared

Golan Heights



to the Sinai, the Golan Heights does not have the area to be an effective buffer. Even if demilitarized, the Golan Heights would not, in terms of warning times and maneuvering distance, provide Israel with any degree of security on her border with Syria. As was mentioned before, Israel cannot afford to come down from the Golan. Some critics of Israel's Golan policy say that she has given up the buffer advantage by allowing settlements in the area (see map p. 71). In other words, by settling the Golan Heights the Israeli population is again vulnerable. But subscribing to that theory would be forgetting the military early warning advantages offered by the Kibbutzim. Thus, the Golan Heights is not a strategic asset to Israel unless occupied by Israel. From a security point of view, Israel cannot change her Golan policy unless she is sure that Syrian policy toward her has favorably changed.¹³⁸

4. The West Bank and Gaza

Unlike the Sinai and the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cannot be viewed as frontier or geographical problems. The threat to Israel from these areas is demographic. Terrorist attacks on Israel originating from the West Bank and Gaza will undoubtedly continue whether Israel or Arab governments control the predominantly Palestinian regions. The same problems would probably exist if Israel returned some, all, or none of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Arab administration.

If, through emotional attachment, Israel should choose to annex these areas the large Arab population would, in the long run, alter the character of Israel and adversely affect her internal security. The best Israel could hope for would be to retain the maximum amount of land and return the maximum number of people. For example, if Israel could



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reach an accord with Jordan whereby the Arab towns of Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron and Jericho were turned over to Jordanian administration while Israel held the remainder of the West Bank, she would have a half million fewer Arabs and would be in a better position to control her population dynamics. However, it seems that Israel's long term security would be best served by restoring Arab authority over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Only a legitimate Arab government at peace with Israel could effectively control the Arab terrorism.¹³⁹

In summary, the importance of geography has been revealed throughout the entire history of Israel from Biblical to modern times. Her borders have always been vulnerable on all land-bound sides and her access to needed raw materials has been seriously threatened. This geographic insecurity was eased in 1967 when Israel acquired, through military conquest, new lands and new frontiers. This new geography did not, however, fully solve Israel's security problems. She did allow herself, through the territorial conquests, some warning of coming attacks and space in which to counter them. Concisely, Israel, by acquiring Arab lands, enhanced her defense. But, the fact that a military defeat could well cost Israel her existence remained. Her security policies were and are, consequently, bound to her geographic vulnerabilities. As is evidenced by the ongoing return of the Sinai to Egypt, Israel will not give up territory without reasonable security guarantees including demilitarization of the returned land. As yet, Israel has been unwilling to retreat from her positions on the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And until she feels that

her security does not depend on these positions she is not likely to return them to Arab sovereignty.

The hostilities between these two peoples, the Arabs and the Jews, arose at least partially because Zionism and national awareness among the Arabs were born and grew at the same time in the same geographic area. Additionally, the initial immigrations, primarily from Europe, were accomplished because of western European influence and support. This association naturally brought on accusations of European colonialism and imperialism from the Arab world. The Arabs having been Ottoman subjects and later under European domination were probably becoming a little xenophobic. The Jews, at the same time, were escaping persecution. Thus, each group was exclusivist. Their respective religions, after all, taught each that they were chosen people. Both are anti-imperialist, but, ironically, each appears to the other as expansionistic and aggressive. The point here is that the hostilities between these two nations cannot be reduced to simple terms. The dynamics of geographic oriented security policy are, undoubtedly, an aid in understanding this most complex problem. And, to be sure, frontier adjustments and related security policy refinements will continue on both sides until the Arab world and Israel find peace.¹⁴⁰

IV. SYRIA AND IRAQ

A. SYRIA

1. Historical and Geographical Setting

The Syrian Arab Republic occupies only a fraction of the geographical area known as greater or geographical Syria. Historically, the name Syria refers to the geographical region lying at the Eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea between the Sinai and Turkish peninsulas. This region was a part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 until the end of World War I. Today the states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel occupy this area known as greater Syria.¹⁴¹

Greater Syria is delineated by natural boundaries. The northern barrier of the region is the Taurus mountains, which are met in the west by the Mediterranean Sea. The eastern desert runs through Arabia to the Sinai Peninsula and bounds the region to the south. The four modern countries which make up the region, however, are for the most part separated from each other by artificial demarcations.¹⁴²

The artificial boundaries cited above were products of British and French geo-politics during and immediately after World War I. In the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 16, 1916, Britain and France agreed to give paramount influence in Syria to the French while Jordan and Palestine went to the British. This dividing of the spoils, as it were, ran counter to another British agreement in which the aid of Sharif Husein of Mecca, the de facto leader of much of the Arab world, was entitled against the Ottomans. In return for his support, Husein

demanded the independence for Iraq, the Arabian peninsula (with the exception of Aden), and for all geographic Syria. Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, agreed to Husein's conditions.¹⁴³

In October 1918, Prince Faysal, the son of Sharif Husein, entered Damascus as a popular hero and assumed that part occupied by French troops, and in July of the following year proclaimed Syria to be independent. But, this independent greater Syria proved to be short lived. The geo-strategies of France and Great Britain were not compatible with the nationalistic goals of Husein and his followers.¹⁴⁴

Problems facing the Arab's quest for statehood in Syria included Britain's desire to maintain a foothold in the area in order to counter Russian encroachments and to protect oil interests. Additionally, France was determined to remain a power in the Middle East, and would, therefore, not give up what she considered to be her colonies. But, the most unsettling, long term hinderance to the formation and maintenance of a Syrian state was Zionism, the emergence of the Jewish state in Palestine. The consequence of these European imperialistic policies was that Husein's declaration of independence was ignored, and at San Remo, Italy in April 1920, France and Great Britain divided greater Syria into mandates. In the region Britain gained mandate authority over Palestine and Transjordan while the French were awarded the area now occupied by Syria and Lebanon.¹⁴⁵

The purpose of recounting the political maneuvering leading to the division of greater Syria into four smaller states is to show the bonds which link the artificially delineated Syrian Arab Republic to the more natural entity of greater Syria. The central point here is

that geographical security policy originating in Damascus, Syria's capital, is often based on the nationalistic concept of greater Syria. Thus, Syria's geo-security policy is frequently manifested in the irredenta. In her recent history Syria has repeatedly demonstrated that geography, particularly this irredenta, is an integral if not the central tenet of their security policy. To support this thesis the study will investigate three Syrian policy issue areas: (1) Alexandretta, (2) Israel/Palestine and (3) Lebanon.

2. Alexandretta

The first geo-security problem facing the new Syrian state was the severance of Alexandretta. As the post-war settlements broke geographic Syria into fragments, the French used a similar dismemberment tactic to weaken the Syrian nationalistic sentiment and foster regionalism. Thus, the northwest province of Alexandretta was given a separate government responsible to the French high commissioner in Beirut.¹⁴⁶

Turkey, ostensibly seeking to protect the large Turkish population of Alexandretta but in reality seeking the geographical advantages offered by the regions excellent port facilities, requested the cession of the district known in Turkey as Hatay. Because of Syrian protest, France put the question to the League of Nations. The League's commission recommended local autonomy in Alexandretta but suggested that Syria remain the guardian in international affairs. The League's findings, however, soon became moot when on 23 June 1939, France, in violation of her Syrian Mandate agreement, ceded Alexandretta to Turkey.¹⁴⁷

South Lebanon & Vicinity

- International boundary
- Israel-Jordan/Lebanon/Syria Armistice Line (20 July 1949)
- - - Demilitarized Zone Limit (20 July 1949)
- All-weather road
- Unsurfaced road or vehicle track
- Railroad
- + Airfield
- Built-up area
- Israeli settlement

Transverse Mercator Projection
Spot elevations in meters

0 15 Miles
0 15 Kilometers



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

The Syrian nationalists naturally saw the cession of Alexandretta as a threat to their geographic security. Additionally, with Palestine being under the British Mandate and Lebanon being separated from Syria by the French, the loss of Alexandretta was beginning to threaten Syria's access to the sea. Being under the French Mandate, Syria had no legally recognized recourse. The disapproval continues today along with the hope that Hatay might someday be retroceded to Syria.¹⁴⁸

3. The Golan Heights and the Palestinian Question

The most important security issue involving geographic determinants facing Syria today is the recovery of the Golan Heights which has been occupied by Israel since June 1967. The strategic value of the Golan Heights has been discussed earlier in this work, but concisely, its value lies primarily in its military significance. The access to the plateau from Israel is extremely restricted, while its elevation (400-1700 ft. above the Huleh Valley) permits a commanding view of Israel's agriculturally rich Huleh Valley and menaces the industrial area of Haifa-Akko only 60 miles distant (see map p. 79). Although the occupation of the Golan places Israeli forces closer to Damascus, the worth to Israel is one of denial. In other words, Israel is much more secure by denying Syria access to the Golan Plateau.¹⁴⁹

The value of the Golan Heights to Syria is a very complex issue and encompasses the larger Palestinian question. As illustrated above, Syrians cannot divorce the Palestinian territorial problems from their own. Palestine was after all a part of greater Syria, and there are many refugees from occupied Palestine living in Syria today. Further,

though less tangible, Syria claims to be the center of the Arab world and the consequent leader in the fight against Israel. Syrian sentiments on Palestine were probably best summed by President Assad in the following statement:

It might be useful to remind those in power in Israel that Palestine is not only part of the Arab homeland but is a principal part of Southern Syria...Palestine will remain part of the liberated Arab homeland and part of our country - Arab Syria¹⁵⁰ or more concisely: Palestine is Southern Syria.¹⁵¹

Syria's geo-security policy did suffer a setback at the hands of Israel in the June War of 1967; she lost the strategic advantage afforded by the Golan Heights. But possibly more damaging, her perceived status as leader of the Arab world was diminished by the humiliating territorial loss. Syria's policy arising from the Golan situation is simple, straightforward, and, from the point of view of most Syrians, without alternative - recapture the occupied territory. The only issues yet to be reconciled then are the means and timing of the recovery.¹⁵²

Most recently, Syria's overriding policy to regain sovereignty over the Golans has been dealt a serious blow. The peace accord between Egypt and Israel has left Syria in the impossible position of confronting Israel alone. Syria blames the untenable position on the United States. In the words of a Syrian official: "The U.S. is trying to divide the Arabs, ignore the Palestinians and engineer a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, while making Israel so strong militarily that she will never give us our land back."¹⁵³ Thus, the Syrian security policy which is rooted in geographical considerations is also a determinant of Syrian-U.S. relations.

Another significant fallout of Syria's Golan policy is growing Soviet influence in the country. If, as cited above, the U.S. is perceived to be responsible for the continued occupation of Syrian territory, the perception offers an opening for increased Soviet suasion. The Syrians, in fact, depend upon the Soviet Union for military material, training and support. In the past, Syria has been unable to prosecute any policy without Soviet backing, and it is reasonably certain that any actions taking place in the short term future will be subject to a degree of Soviet approval.¹⁵⁴

4. Lebanon

Nowhere is Syria's geo-security policy more evident than in its actions toward Lebanon. The maintenance of a healthy Lebanese state is a fundamental tenet of Syrian policy. President Assad said the following about the well-being of Lebanon, "It is difficult to distinguish between the security of Lebanon, in the wider sense of the word, and the security of Syria."¹⁵⁵ Another Syrian official, Zuheir Muhsin, had this to say about Lebanon: "The defense of Lebanon is an integral part of the defense program of Syria and the Palestinian revolution."¹⁵⁶ But, recently Lebanon's health has been threatened by the disruption of the delicate internal demographic balance and resultant civil war.

France planted the seeds, so to speak, of these demographic problems when she, as mandate authority, carved the Lebanese state from greater Syria. Lebanon, in 1920, was created in order to separate Syria's predominantly Christian populated areas from the predominantly Muslim areas. France arranged to include the Muslim populated port of Tripoli in the new Lebanese state and thus diluted the Christian

majority. By 1975 the Christians had lost their majority. Political stability probably could have been maintained if large numbers of Palestinian refugees had not placed disproportionate weight on the demographic balance.¹⁵⁷

The immediate cause of Lebanon's security problems was the large influx of Palestinians following the 1967 June War and, more directly, after "Black September" (the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organization from Jordan) in 1970. The mostly Muslim Palestinians altered Lebanon's social structure, and their commando activities directed against Israel brought disruptive retaliatory raids and shelling from Israel. The now minority Christians, particularly those in southern Lebanon, began to fear the loss of their political power base. Some even became allied with the Israelis because of their common anti-PLO feelings. The net result of the social and political pressure caused by the Palestinian refugees was the 1975-76 civil war.¹⁵⁸

The hostilities in Lebanon presented serious threats to Syria's geographic-security system for three reasons. First, the mountains of southern Lebanon provide Syria with a natural defensive boundary. If the political disintegration of Lebanon permitted Israel to annex this southern area, Syria would be seriously menaced. A second threat arose repeatedly during the civil war when some Christian parties presented partition as a solution to the hostilities. Syria's response to this partition suggestion was that another Israel-like state was not needed in the area. The military disadvantages to Syria from such a solution would obviously be similar to that of Israeli

annexation, but the probable domestic political ramifications presented a third problem area. If the Syrian government permitted such a minority group secession, even in Lebanon, she would loosen the control over her own many minority groups.¹⁵⁹

Syria's response to Lebanon's political and social disintegration was to dispatch various military units including Syrian-backed Palestinian units and regular Syrian army units into the troubled country. Ostensibly, these troops were sent to "keep the peace," but they, in fact, aided the Christian Phalangists against the Palestinians and Lebanese leftists.¹⁶⁰

The Syria strategy, in supporting the Phalangists, was to ensure the geographical integrity of Lebanon. Syria obviously felt that if the Christians were defeated or greatly weakened by the combined Palestinian and leftist forces Israel would be galvanized into military intervention. The danger, from Syria's point of view, was that a joint Christian and Israeli action would eventually separate southern Lebanon from central government control and, by so doing, give Israel the highly valued geographic buffer.¹⁶¹

In 1978, the civil strife in Lebanon again broke into hostile conflict. But, by this time, Israel and the Christian militiamen of Lebanon had formed a symbiotic relationship. The Christians depended upon Israel for their arms supply and, in return, the Christians kept the Palestinians militarily off balance. The result of this relationship was that Israel had gained a certain degree of geographic security. This Israeli gain, of course, translated from the Syrian view point into geographic insecurity. Thus, Syrian troops entered the renewed

Lebanese conflict supporting regular Lebanese troops and Palestinians against the Christians. The goal, as in the 1975-76 civil war, was to ensure the geographic integrity of their buffer. Thus, the Syrians were not seeking to advance an ideology or bolster a religion or government. Rather, they were prosecuting their own national security policy based on the geographic buffer of Lebanon.¹⁶²

At the date of this writing, Syria still has more than 20,000 "peace keeping" troops in Lebanon while Syrian jets periodically clash over Lebanon with Israeli air forces. Syria is, thereby, fulfilling two basic strategic needs. First, by keeping herself militarily active against Israel, she fulfills her self-appointed role as leader of the Arab's war against Israel and exhibits no acquiescence in her policy to regain the Golan Heights. Secondly, Syria continues to maintain, albeit weakly, the territorial integrity of Lebanon.¹⁶³

Thus, it has been demonstrated that Syria's security policy has been and is principally based on geographical consideration, particularly the recovery of irredenta. Additionally, she strives to hold together the Arab countries of greater Syria to form a buffer system and an unofficial alliance against Israel.

B. IRAQ

1. Historical and Geographical Setting

Long in the backwater of Turkish and world geo-politics, the modern state of Iraq emerged from the defeated Ottoman Empire following World War I. The country, made of three Ottoman provinces, Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul, located primarily in ancient Mesopotamia, was an



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artificial creation of European politics. Significantly, she was not a naturally evolved nation; she was rent with ethnic and religious schisms and her borders were established largely to satisfy the needs of external powers.¹⁶⁴

To understand the origins of Iraq's geographic and demographic situation and the resulting geo-security policy it is necessary to investigate, if only briefly, the geo-strategy of the competing world powers during the years leading up to the first world war and the subsequent Iraqi independence.

In 1899 Germany obtained from the Ottoman Empire a concession to build a railroad from southwest Turkey to Baghdad; another concession was granted in 1902 to continue the railroad from Baghdad to Basrah on the Persian Gulf. The German goal in these concessions was, of course, to gain commercial and political influence in the Middle East Region.¹⁶⁵

Great Britain looked upon Mesopotamia, Persia and Afghanistan as vital geographic links between the Mediterranean and her most prized colony, India. England felt that her influence had to be paramount in these areas in order to ensure the security of India. Additionally, Britain was concerned about the safety of her Persian oil interests. Thus, the rise of German influence, represented by the Berlin-Baghdad-Basrah railway, threatened Britain's paramountcy and, consequently, the well-being of her mercantile system.¹⁶⁶

A third world power whose geo-strategy ran counter to the aspiration of both Germany and Great Britain was Russia. The Czars' long standing quest to expand southward to warm water was inconsistent with the commercial and security goals of the other two imperialistic powers.

Russia was, however, exhausted from her war with the Japanese (1904-05) and was temporarily unable to compete with her rivals. Through diplomacy she was able to cut her losses by gaining a sphere of influence in northern Persia. The British permitted this Russian sphere of influence officially in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, and by so doing, Britain greatly enhanced her own Middle Eastern position. As a quid pro quo the war-weakened Russians had no choice but to acknowledge British influence and special interests in the Persian Gulf area.¹⁶⁷

The net effect of the Anglo-Russian Agreement in the Iraqi area was that only Germany and Britain were left competing for influence. The British, exercising considerable political power with local leaders, were able to neutralize the German influence and, consequently, stall the Berlin-Baghdad-Basrah railroad construction. Thus, the battle lines for the first world war were beginning to emerge in Middle Eastern geo-politics.¹⁶⁸

World War I facilitated the Arab independence or nationalistic movement. Represented by Husein ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, the Arabs agreed to support the Arab independence movement following the war. However, the allies, specifically the British and French, were less inclined to make good their promises after victory was achieved. Iraq and the other Arab countries were, in fact, liberated from the defeated Ottoman Empire, but Great Britain was unwilling to allow self-determination. Iraq was still an asset in the geographic security system of the British Empire, and influence in that Middle Eastern nation would not readily be surrendered by Great Britain.¹⁶⁹

When the allied powers met in San Remo, Italy (28 April 1920) following the war, France and Great Britain were awarded Mandates over Arab territories of the fallen Ottoman Empire. Iraq and Palestine were placed under the British Mandate and Syria was mandated to France. However, there was some problem in establishing the borders between the two Mandates. Mosul and a large portion of the northern territory of present day Iraq were originally designated for French influence. The British saw this would-be French controlled territory as a buffer between themselves and the Bolshevik Russians. But, it soon became clear that Russia would be unable to achieve territorial dominance in the Middle East as she had hoped. In short, the British found that she would not have to share any frontiers with the powerless Russians and would, therefore, not need the French buffer.¹⁷⁰

Britain, seeing the Russians as helpless in her Middle Eastern sphere of activity, reasserted her influence in Mosul (British troops, to strengthen her bargaining position, occupied Mosul after the armistice was signed with Turkey on 30 October 1918.) The French, of course, resisted these British power politics, but acquiesced in return for promised security backing in Europe, British concessions in Syria and a share in Mosul oil wealth. Thus, the Ottoman territory was transferred to Great Britain instead of France and the northern border of Iraq was delineated.¹⁷¹

The nomadic desert tribes also presented border problems. It was impossible to determine a boundary with Saudi Arabia which would not hinder the seasonal movements of these tribes. Treaty arrangements were, therefore, made with the Saudis which allows the Muntafiq, Dhafir

and Amarat tribesmen to enter Iraq. The same tribal problem existed on the Syrian frontier. The difficulties here were compounded by questions of Tigris and Euphrates water rights. All negotiations, in this instance, were handled by the British and French High Commissioner for their respective Mandates. Not until 1932 did these negotiators reach a satisfactory resolution.¹⁷²

Perhaps the most difficult settlement for the British to achieve was over the Iraqi border with Turkey. Under Kemal Ataturk, Turkey, like Iraq, was also involved in nation-building and was reluctant to give up strategic territory to a conceivably hostile neighbor. Thus, Turkey greatly preferred southern borders which extended far enough south to allow easy access into the Mesopotamia plain. And, naturally, Iraq and the British wanted to deny such a strategic advantage to the Turks. The issue finally had to be resolved by the League of Nations which ruled in favor of the British. The ruling gave Iraq a significant geographic advantage but it also placed a large Kurdish minority in Iraq. The remaining border with Persia presented no legal problems so long as Britain exercised extensive influence on both sides of the boundary.¹⁷³

The Mandate of Iraq awarded to the British under the San Remo Agreement provoked extensive protest in Iraq. Arab nationalism which began under Ottoman domination continued and perhaps intensified under the non-Muslim British. This dissatisfaction with foreign rule, by July 1920, had reached explosive levels. An anti-British revolt broke out in the south of Iraq and soon spread through one-third of the country.¹⁷⁴

In an effort to defuse the revolt a provisional Arab government was then created. This government came into being in October of 1920 and operated under the direction of the British High Commission for Iraq. Prince Faisal, the son of Husein ibu Ali and descendant of the Prophet was installed as monarch in order to lend legitimacy. Faisal was approved in a referendum of the Iraqi elite by near unanimity and on August 23, 1921, was proclaimed king.¹⁷⁵

The British government, however, was still not able to win approval for their own presence; in fact, the disapproval was growing even in Great Britain. Thus, as dictated by circumstances, the British, after many attempts to soften the Mandate relationship, supported Iraq's entry into the League of Nations and thereby granted full sovereignty and independence to Iraq. Britain was able to maintain the Iraqi link to her security system, despite Iraq's independence, through the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which took effect on October 3, 1932, the day of independence. This alliance was designed to last for 25 years, guaranteeing mutual assistance in time of war and "full and frank consultation ...in all matters of foreign policy." The treaty, incidentally, was utilized by the British in 1941 to justify their reoccupation of Iraq during World War II. Again, Great Britain was protecting strategic interests in the Persian Gulf oil fields and the routes to India. At a time when it appeared very likely that the Arabs would cast their lot with the Germans the British took the only prudent strategic move and denied the geographically important Iraq to the Germans.¹⁷⁶

Thus, it has been exhibited that Iraq was created largely as an instrument of European geo-security policies. Her international

boundaries exist as a result of Great Britain's power and influence. But, in many respects, the best interests of Iraq and Britain were parallel. The Iraqi state that was carved out of the dying Ottoman Empire was and is geographically very fortunate. She has, perhaps, the greatest agriculture potential of any country in the Middle Eastern region and her oil reserves are among the world's richest. . . Additionally she has easy access to the world's markets through the Persian Gulf. However, the artificial delineation of Iraq's international borders wrought significant internal and frontier security problems.¹⁷⁷

Demographically speaking, Iraq is in an unstable position. She is a mosaic of ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional differences - differences which, at times, have threatened the security of the nation. The population of approximately twelve and a half million is comprised of roughly 71% Arabs, over 18% Kurds, 2 1/2% Turkomans, .7% Assyrians and others.¹⁷⁸ The political control of the country is, of course, held by the Arabs. But, the authority of the central government has been repeatedly challenged by the above listed minority groups. Significant among the challenges are those mounted by the Kurds.¹⁷⁹

2. Demographic Security Problems (the Kurds)

The insecurity caused by the autonomy seeking minority groups is one of two major national security problem areas which are rooted in Iraq's geography. The second is guaranteeing her opening to the Persian Gulf and the high seas. The policy and concern arising from Iraq's small, vulnerable opening to the Gulf at the mouth of Shatt al Arab has been the catalyst in long term disputes with the Iranians and

Kuwaitis. The Kurdish, Shatt al Arab and Kuwaiti issues are all a result of Iraq's geographic situation. Additionally, these issues have dominated in recent years the security policy of Iraq. Thus, to further illustrate their significance and support of the thesis, the Kurdish problem and the Shatt al Arab and Kuwaiti issues will be examined in more detail.¹⁸⁰

As cited above, the main minority ethnic groups is that of the Kurds. Most of the Iraqi Kurds live in the north and north-east areas of the country. Small Kurdish groups also live in Syria and Soviet Russia, but the Iraqi Kurds are a part of approximately six million who extend into Turkey and Iran. Although Iraq has far fewer Kurds than either Turkey or Iran, the percentage of the total population is much greater in Iraq and, therefore, more politically significant.¹⁸¹

When the multinational Ottoman Empire was being dismembered following World War I the Wilsonian principle of self-determination stirred the national aspirations of the Kurds. Primarily as a result of their friendly relations with the British the Kurds were promised, under the Treaty of Sevre's, an autonomous and possibly independent Kurdistan. The designated territory for Kurdistan fell mainly in what is today eastern Turkey. But, the artificial line separating these Kurds in eastern Turkey or Kurdistan from the kinsmen in Iran, Iraq and Syria did not curb the nationalism on either side of the line.¹⁸²

The Kurdish national aspirations were manifested in a revolt or series of revolts. In Turkey the rebellion lingered for 12 years until crushed by the Turkish military in 1947. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Kurds were demanding autonomy from the British who were exercising Mandate

authority over the country. But, Great Britain was not about to give away any strategic or economic oil influence in the area. The Kurd's recourse was rebellion which was intermittent and widespread in 1919, 1927 and during the 1930-32 period. There was very little or no success to which the Kurds could rally. They had no outside sponsor to aid them against their relatively powerful British and Iraqi opponents. However, this situation changed when the Russians, with all their newly-acquired strength, occupied Azerbaijan during World War II. Moscow offered its protection and encouragement to various independence seeking groups in Iran. In January 1946 the Iranian Kurds under Russian guidance declared their independence as the Republic of Mahabad. Being contiguous to Mahabad the Kurdish movement in Iraq was naturally accelerated.¹⁸³

Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, who led the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq from 1943-45, moved several thousand of his tribal revolutionaries into Mahabad to support the national effort. They were soon forced to flee into Russia. The absence of Barzani and his troops essentially killed the rebellion in Iraq from 1945 until 1959.¹⁸⁴

Turkey, Iran and Iraq acted in concert to suppress the Kurds, and were consequently able to keep to a minimum any separatist activity. This cooperation fell along the Iraqi monarchy, in 1958. Under the new Qassem government al-Barzani and his remaining 855 followers were allowed to return to Iraq on October 6, 1959. Qassem's warming to al-Barzani and the Kurds was indicative of growing Iraqi-Soviet friendship. As this friendship cooled so did the political fortunes of the Kurds. But, the Soviet relationship was not the absolute barometer;

in fact, the nationalistic tendencies of the Kurds were simply too divergent from the goals of the Arab controlled central government.¹⁸⁵

The rebellion was rekindled when, in July of 1961, Kurdish demands of autonomy were rejected by the Qassem regime. The rebellion, backed extensively by Iran, lasted until May 1975. The Kurds lost the wherewithal to carry on their revolt when Iran and Iraq reached a detente. As a consequence of the Iran-Iraqi rapprochement, Iran stopped all military and financial aid to the Kurds. Thus, in a very short while, the rebellion ended and the Kurds were again suppressed by the cooperative efforts of Turkey, Iran and Iraq.¹⁸⁶

Thus, the Kurds, by accident of arbitrary boundaries, became a nation without legally-recognized territory. Their quest for statehood and autonomy is in direct opposition to the security goals of the central Iraqi government. The basic problem between the Arab and Kurd ethnic groups of Iraq is one of complete distrust. The Iraqis are convinced that the real goal of the Kurds is to create their own independent state in the oil-rich north-eastern region of the country. The Kurds, on the other hand, deny that they want to secede. They contend though that the central government wishes to deprive them of their rights, specifically their rightful share of the oil wealth. The officially-backed immigration of Arabs into the Kirkuk region seems to substantiate their fears.¹⁸⁷

The Arabs, to support their suspicions, need only to point to a provocative interview given by al-Barzani, the Kurdish leader, to an American correspondent. In the interview Barzani said that for humanitarian or military help the Kurds would take the Kirkuk oil

fields and turn them over to the Americans to operate. Because the Kurds are ethnically different and they are so regionalized they present a demographic and geographic security problem to Iraq. Kurdish militancy can only be effective with outside help; they have therefore been used as an instrument of Iranian and Soviet policy to exert influence or power on Iraq. Concisely, the Kurdish quest for autonomy has been a source of conflict, political instability and a serious drain on the country's resources. The Kurdish issue is a major national security problem in Iraq. The Kurds and their goals are a constant in the politics of this volatile region. It seems to be only a question of time before this minority ethnic group again threatens Iraqi security.¹⁸⁸

3. The Shatt al Arab Dispute

The Shatt al Arab issue is a boundary dispute between Iraq and Iran. The origins of this dispute go back to the Ottoman Empire which controlled both sides of the Tigris and Euphrates estuary known as the Shatt al Arab. When Iraq became independent in 1932 she also claimed, as a legacy of the fallen empire, both sides of the river. Iran, however, has long claimed that the proper border demarcation should run through the center of the estuary. As the oil shipping increased from the ports of Basrah, Abadan and Khorramshahr the issue became more heated. With the international boundary on the Iranian side of the river all trade, even that exclusively in Iranian ports, came under the control of Iraq.¹⁸⁹ Iran, whose economic well-being depended so greatly on oil revenues, looked upon her position on the Shatt al Arab as unacceptable. Consequently, she unilaterally declared her

border with Iraq to be the middle of the river. After many incidents and accusations, a compromise was reached on the boundary issue in 1937. A treaty between the contending kingdoms was signed confirming Iraq's sovereignty over the 100-mile stretch of the estuary which divides the two countries. Iraq also retained exclusive navigational rights up to the low water mark on the Iranian side. Iran, however, did win a boundary line adjustment in front of her key ports of Abadan, Khorramshahr, and Khosrowabad where the line was moved to the "thalweg" (line of greatest depth or fastest current in the river).¹⁹⁰

The 1937 Shatt al Arab treaty also had provisions confirming navigation rights to ships of all nations. Iran and Iraq also agreed to establish a convention regarding pilotage and installation and maintenance of navigational aids. The convention was to be worked out by a commission with equal Iranian and Iraqi representation. Agreement, however, broke down when Iran insisted that the commission should have the executive powers to establish the convention. Iraq, having sovereignty over most of the waters of the Shatt al Arab, thought that the commission should have only consultative rights. Because of this seemingly insignificant disagreement, no convention was ever reached and the validity of the treaty remained in doubt.¹⁹¹

The Hashimite dynasty in Iraq and the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran maintained friendly relations until 1958, when the Hashimites fell in a coup. During this time there was very little dispute over the Shatt al Arab boundary. But, as trade and associated seaborne traffic increased and oil revenues became more and more crucial to Iraq's economic well-being, the value of her sovereign rights over the Shatt

al Arab, the only access of the otherwise land-locked nation to the open sea, became strategic in dimension.¹⁹²

After the Qassem coup in 1958 Baghdad's relations with Iran began to fray; in December of 1959, the Iraqi government questioned the validity of the 1937 boundary treaty and demanded that the territory concessions granted to Iran in that treaty (that part of the Shatt al Arab roadstead opposite Iran's three major ports) be returned to Iraqi sovereignty. These political actions by Iraq initiated a series of minor border skirmishes leading to an Iranian invalidation of the 1937 agreement and a counterclaim of Iranian sovereignty to the thalweg. Mounting tensions on the border eventually led to complete stoppage of Iranian shipping on the Shatt al-Arab in early 1961.¹⁹³

From 1961 until 1969 relations between Iran and Iraq remained, for the most part, strained. Two notable exceptions occurred during the regimes of Abdul Salom Aref (November 1963-April 1966) and after the July 1968 coup of President Bakr when the contested boundary was at least negotiated. But by April of 1969, Iran's military superiority was sufficient enough to assert her claims on the Shatt al-Arab. She dispatched a cargo ship with naval and air protection through the estuary to the Persian Gulf. For the next six years there was no movement toward a permanent settlement. Iran, in fact, kept the Iraqis militarily off balance by supporting the Barzani-led Kurdish rebellion. Iraq's internal security and her Persian Gulf access were threatened as a direct result of this long standing boundary dispute.¹⁹⁴

Quite unexpectedly, Iran and Iraq reconciled their differences when in March of 1975, the Shah of Iran and Iraq's Vice President

Takriti reached an agreement. The reconciliation cost the Kurds their Iranian support and Iraq, consequently, enhanced her security position.¹⁹⁵

4. The Kuwaiti Dispute

The Shatt al-Arab issue demonstrated Iraq's geographic vulnerability - her access to the open seas could hardly be more fragile. This insecurity brought about by her limited access to the sealanes perhaps explains, at least in part, the Kuwaiti issue. In June of 1961, the sheikdom of Kuwait and Britain signed an instrument terminating the 1899 Anglo-Kuwait agreement that had given the British hegemony over that small state. Six days later, on June 25, 1961, Prime Minister Qassem of Iraq claimed sovereignty over oil-rich Kuwait. The claim was justified on the grounds that Kuwait was once a part of the province of Basra in the now defunct Ottoman Empire. Qassem further stated that the British recognized the Kuwaiti attachment to Basra in the 1899 treaty. Kuwait, Great Britain and the League of Arab States all rejected Iraq's claim, and a number of Arab states, in fact, sent military contingents to Kuwait to replace British forces.¹⁹⁶

The central point in recounting the Iraq-Kuwait issue is to show policy and motives in defending their respective interests which are so largely dependent on geography. Qassem's motives in trying to gain control over Kuwait were, of course, in part economic - the oil reserves of Kuwait were and are substantial. But, very important strategically to Iraq was that sovereignty over Kuwait would broaden her opening to the Persian Gulf - again the policy grew out of geography.

Again, in pursuit of the same geographic goals, Iraq on December 11, 1972, sent a road-building crew with military protection into Kuwaiti

territory and began building a road to the Persian Gulf. This time the aggressive act was justified, according to Iraq, because of the military threat from Iran. Again, political pressures from other Arab leaders forced Iraq to withdraw. But Iraq, persistent and undisturbed by the growing resentment among her fellow Arabs, moved forces into Kuwait only three months after the road-building incident. This time, a violent confrontation resulted in two dead and four injured Kuwaiti border policemen. But, Iraq apparently won Kuwaiti acquiescence to use her neighbor's territory for strategic purposes. Iraqi goals evidently were to acquire a strip of Kuwait's coastal territory and the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. Such an acquisition would have provided protection for Iraq's new deep-sea port of Um Qasi. Kuwait was supposedly willing to lease this territory to Iraq as long as Iraq recognized Kuwaiti sovereignty over the leased parcels.¹⁹⁷

Today, there is still no permanent solution between Iraq and Kuwait. But, with the Islamic revolution weakening the military strength of Iran, Iraq's threat perception has undoubtedly lessened. President Saddam Hussein of Iraq has, in fact, been supporting the Arab rebellion in the Iranian state of Khuzestan and is believed to be supporting Iranian Kurds. Also, Iraq has warned that she intended to withdraw from the 1975 peace agreement with Iran. In short, Iraq's sea-borne trade is today possibly more secure than at any time since her independence.¹⁹⁸

To recount, Iraq in 1932 joined the family of nations with two major security debits - the would-be Kurdish state within Iraq and her small vulnerable access to the Persian Gulf through the Shatt al-Arab.

Ever since that date, the national security policies and actions of Iraq have been directed principally at overcoming these two geographically oriented threat areas mentioned above.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This study was undertaken to examine the thesis that nation-states or countries, particularly Middle Eastern countries, have security policy tenets which are dictated by geographical considerations. Before progressing into the research it seemed intuitively pleasing to allow that security policy had to be affected, if only tangentially, by geographic characteristics. Policy designers must, after all, seek to protect the geographical entity which constitutes the state. At closer inspection, however, not only was the thesis substantiated but geography was found to be at the very heart of much of the Middle East's security problems and policies.

The research revealed that Saudi Arabia has two geographic features which makes her vulnerable to aggression: Her oil fields and her communication routes to the high seas. The Saudi geo-security policy is designed, above all else, to safeguard these areas, and all other security policy of Saudi Arabia seems to be rooted to this basic tenet.

Egypt's security policy makers, it was discovered, must be ever mindful of her critical areas, the Nile River and its delta and the Suez Canal. The Nile Valley and delta allows Egypt to exist as a nation in the middle of an otherwise uninhabitable desert. And the Suez Canal is a geographic asset which contributes greatly to the economic well-being of the country. The security policies of Egypt are to a great degree bound to this geographic situation. Additionally, the geo-security policies of various external powers were shown to extend

to Egypt and the Suez Canal. Egypt is strategically important to world politics simply because of her position.

Israel, it was found, is an ideal example of geography determining security policy. Her very existence or survival as a nation depends upon the maintenance of secure borders and free trade/communications routes. She has fought a series of wars with her Arab neighbors with the objective of protecting her very limited geographic assets.

In the case of Syria and Iraq, certain strategically important geographic positions were shown to dictate much of their international and domestic politics. These two countries, in particular, have policies which are determined by demography. Syria and Iraq are a group of old nations occupying new states. Maintaining a legitimate central government in the midst of competing nations has been central in the security policies of these countries.

In short, this study revealed ample evidence that geographic considerations permeate security policies in the Middle Eastern region. The importance of these considerations have not been diminished by modern technology or communication. They have perhaps become, in instances, more subtle but not less crucial.

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
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